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Abstract 
Research suggests that positively reframing past negative experiences is beneficial for 
coping, but little work has investigated the cognitive abilities underlying this process. Using both 
experimental and ideographic methodology, this study examined the role of a specific dimension 
of executive function (EF) – attention shifting – in positively reframing and coping with negative 
memories. Further, this research compared the roles of affective shifting (shifting between 
emotionally positive and negative information) and non-affective shifting (shifting attention 
between non-emotional information). A sample of university students (N = 134) wrote about the 
three most distressing events that ever happened to them and rated the memories on several 
qualities (e.g., importance). Then they were randomly assigned to perform a non-affective 
shifting (NAS), affective shifting (AS), or affective non-shifting (Control) task. Finally, 
participants were asked to positively reframe the memories. Ratings of mood states were 
collected at several points and reframing narratives were coded for several indices of positive 
reframing. Participants in the AS group wrote more about self-growth than the other two groups, 
but only among those who reported their memories to be highly important. Moreover, faster 
responding to the two shifting tasks were linked with indicators of better reframing. More 
resolutions, but not other indicator of reframing, predicted more increase in positive mood after 
reframing. Shifting was not directly linked with mood changes. Finally, better reframing was 
predicted by several individual difference factors such as female, worse feelings after memory 
retrieval and memories of less severe events. Implications for reframing, coping and models of 
EF are discussed. 
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The Role of Affective Shifting in Positively Reframing and Coping with Negative 
Autobiographical Memories 
Multiple lines of work have suggested that remembering negative life experiences in 
positive ways is associated with greater emotional adjustment and well-being (e.g., Pals, 2006; 
Pennebaker; Mayne, & Francis, 1997). Unfortunately, positively reframing negative experiences 
can be extremely difficult in some situations and for certain individuals. It is thus important to 
identify the factors that affect this ability and understand the mechanisms underlying the process 
of memory reframing. Evidence from the autobiographical memory (AM) and meaning making 
literatures suggests that executive function (EF) may play a part in remembering and processing 
past negative events. Further, it appears that a specific aspect of EF – attention shifting – may be 
particularly crucial, but no studies have examined this possibility.   
Research on children’s EF development has started to emphasize a distinction between 
emotion-related (“hot”) and non-emotional (“cool”) EF, and has suggested that these two types 
of EF may have overlapping yet different neurocognitive networks (e.g., Zelazo & Müller, 2002). 
Consistent with this notion, findings on both adults and children have suggested that measures 
that presumably tap hot EF have stronger associations with emotional functioning than measures 
of cool EF (e.g., Malooly, Genet, & Siemer, 2013; Prencipe & Zelazo, 2005). Therefore, it is 
possible that attention shifting between emotionally significant information (to be referred to as 
“affective shifting”) may play a more important role in memory reframing and the associated 
emotion regulatory processes than shifting between non-emotional information (to be referred to 
as “non-affective shifting”). However, to date, there have been no experimental tests of the 
impact of EF on emotion regulation, and it is unknown whether cool and hot EF contribute 
equally.  
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This study was designed to address these unanswered questions, with an attempt to bridge 
the traditionally separate areas of work on EF, AM and emotion regulation. Specifically, this 
study used an experimental paradigm to directly test whether attention shifting impacts one’s 
reframing of negative AMs and emotion after reframing; and whether affective and non-affective 
shifting exert different influences. Moreover, this research assessed whether variations in 
peoples’ shifting abilities were predictive of individual differences in reframing and emotion 
after reframing. Finally, this study explored other individual difference factors that contributed to 
differences in memory reframing.   
Memory Reframing and Coping 
Coping with memories of negative life experiences is important for our well-being, and 
failure to do so could lead to severe psychological consequences (e.g., posttraumatic stress 
disorder, or PTSD; Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). People cope with past experiences 
using a variety of strategies, as reflected in their autobiographical memory narratives about such 
experiences. Autobiographical memory (AM), by definition, is a knowledge base of personal 
information that contains both specific memories of past events and conceptual, self-related 
information (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). When asked to write about a negative AM, 
people often make meaning in the narratives. For example, one may state that his or her life was 
changed or a lesson was learned because of the event (e.g., Greenhoot, Sun, Bunnell, & Lindboe, 
2013; King, Scollon, Ramsey, & Williams, 2000). References to such meaning have been 
proposed to reflect past or current attempts to cope with the negative feelings associated with the 
memories (Park, 2010).  
Researchers are interested in identifying adaptive ways of meaning making and have 
found that meaning that involves reframing past negative events in positive ways (referred to as 
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“memory reframing” or “positive reframing” for short in this manuscript) is generally associated 
with better psychological outcomes (Bauer & McAdams, 2004; Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Larson, 1998; Lepore, Fernandez-Berrocal, Ragan, & Ramos, 2004; Lilgendahl & McAdams, 
2011; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001; Pals, 2006; Pennebaker; Mayne, 
& Francis, 1997). For example, Pals (2006) reported that memory narratives about difficult life 
experiences that contained themes of positive self-transformation predicted more satisfaction 
with life and physical healthy almost ten years later. Similarly, Lilgendahl and McAdams (2011) 
found that the degree to which negative life events were perceived as causing personal growth in 
life story narratives of mid-life adults was associated with better psychological health.  
These results suggest that positive reframing may be an effective way of emotionally 
coping with memories of difficult life experiences. Nonetheless, a few recent studies have 
revealed negative correlations between positive reframing and psychological well-being (e.g., 
Greenhoot, et al., 2013; Sales, Merrill, & Fivush, 2013). For example, Greenhoot et al. (2013) 
reported that resolutions in memory narratives about traumatic events (e.g., ‘Things got better in 
the end’) were linked with more psychological symptoms, particularly for people with abuse 
histories. Although a possible interpretation was that resolutions are maladaptive, another 
(perhaps more likely) explanation was that individuals with more symptoms tended to write 
about resolutions as a way to reduce negative feelings associated with the memories. However, it 
is difficult to address this possibility in the extant literature because most research has focused on 
the links between positive reframing and concurrent mental health measures. No one has tracked 
participants’ emotional responses before and after memory reframing to directly examine the 
emotional impact. Thus, in this study I collected participants’ mood states before and after 
positive reframing to later determine whether there was a noticeable increase in positive mood 
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and decrease in negative mood. 
It is worth mentioning that positive reframing has been evaluated in several ways in the 
literature. Some researchers have asked people to report whether they found self-growth or other 
benefits in past negative events (e.g., Alea & Bluck, 2013; Park, 2010), whereas others looked 
for evidence of reframing in people’s memory narratives (e.g., Banks & Salmon, 2013; Dunlop 
& Tracy, 2013; Lilgendahl, McLean & Mansfield, 2013; McLean & Thorne, 2003). A recent 
study reported little overlap between these two types of measures, and found that global 
indicators derived from memory narratives were better predictors of well-being measures (e.g., 
Alea & Bluck, 2013; Banks & Salmon, 2013; Dunlop & Tracy, 2013; Greenhoot et al., 2013; 
Lilgendahl, McLean & Mansfield, 2013; Waters, Shallcross, & Fivush, 2013). In comparison, 
there have been mixed findings regarding whether self-report of positive reframing is associated 
with better well-being. For example, several studies have reported inconsistent results regarding 
whether stress-related growth, defined as positive change in one’s perspectives and behaviors as 
a result of a traumatic event, is associated with better psychological adjustment following trauma 
(Helgeson, Reynolds, & Tomich, 2006; Linley & Joseph, 2005; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004; 
Waters, Shallcross, & Fivush, 2013). Therefore, in the proposed study, I measured positive 
reframing based on what participants said in their reframing narratives instead of self-reports, 
and directly tested how variations in indices of positive reframing were associated with 
participants’ emotional responses after reframing.  
There are many different ways in which people positively reframe past negative events. 
For example, one may focus on resolutions (e.g., “We talked and everything was fine in the 
end”), feel grateful that things were not worse (e.g., “I am thankful that I was not seriously 
hurt.”), or find benefits as results of bad experiences including practical or externally oriented 
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(e.g., “We became closer friends because of that event”) and self-focused benefits (e.g., “I 
became a stronger person” “I learned that you should never take life for granted”). These 
common types of positive meaning (to be referred to as Resolution, Gratitude, External Benefit 
and Self-Growth in this article) have all been assessed in prior studies (e.g., Greenhoot et al., 
2013; McLean, 2008), but Self-Growth has received the most attention.  
It has been proposed that there are several types of Self-Growth varying in sophistication 
and thus requiring different levels of cognitive effort. For example, McLean (2008) identified 
three levels of self-related meaning in terms of cognitive effort required: Traits (Level 1), Beliefs 
and Outlook Connections (Level two; e.g., attitudes and perspectives about the world), and 
Personal Growth (Level 3; e.g., development of maturity and strength). Converging with this 
study, findings from several other studies also suggest that the most effortful kinds of Self-
Growth involve Personal Growth (Bauer, McAdams, & Sakeda, 2005; King et al., 2000; 
McLean, 2008; Pals, 2006). However, no one has compared Self-Growth (regardless of its 
subtypes) with the other common types of positive reframing as mentioned above (i.e., 
Resolution, Gratitude and External Benefit) in terms of sophistication. Accumulating evidence 
has suggested that various types of reframing have different mental health implications (e.g., 
Bonanno, 2013; Pasupathi, 2013); and thus in the present study, we coded participants’ 
reframing narratives for all four categories of positive reframing, and assessed their associations 
with the emotional state measures after completing the reframing narratives.  
Given the common belief that positively reframing negative experiences is beneficial for 
coping, it is important to identify the factors that affect this process. Although no previous 
research has directly examined this question, findings from the AM literature suggest that 
executive function (EF) may play a critical role. In the next section, I will provide a brief review 
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of this work.  
Executive Function and Memory Reframing  
Executive function. Executive function (EF) is an umbrella term for a variety of higher 
cognitive processes that control and regulate lower level processes (e.g., perception, semantic 
memory) to effortfully guide behavior toward a goal, especially in non-routine situations (e.g., 
Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Banich, 2009). Like other psychological constructs (e.g., memory), EF 
is multidimensional and has several separable yet interrelated subfunctions, such as working 
memory, information updating, inhibitory control and shifting.  
Working memory is broadly defined as the cognitive system responsible for temporarily 
storing information required to support ongoing processes. Therefore, working memory is 
commonly involved in other EF subfunctions (e.g., Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2012; Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). A simple and widely used working memory test 
is the digit span task, in which participants are represented with a series of digits and need to 
immediately repeat them back. More complex working memory tasks require participants to 
perform a secondary task while holding some information in working memory (Barrett, Tugade, 
& Engle, 2004).   
An EF dimension that is closely related to working memory is information updating - the 
ability to monitor and update working memory according to a goal. Information updating allows 
us to code incoming information for relevance to the task at hand and then replace old, no longer 
useful items held in working memory with newer, more relevant information (Lehto, 1996; 
Morris & Jones, 1900). A commonly used task to assess this ability is the keep track task 
(Yntema & Schulman, 1967), in which individuals are shown a number of words, one by one, 
and are asked to remember the last word in two or more categories.  
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Inhibition is another important aspect of EF, which refers to the ability to deliberately 
inhibit dominant or proponent responses in order to achieve a goal. Example tasks used to assess 
inhibition include the color-word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) and the antisaccade task, both 
requiring participants to stop a response that is relatively automatic. For instance, the color-word 
Stroop task involves showing participants a series of color words that are written in colors (e.g., 
a word ‘green’ written in blue), and asking them to identify the color in which the words are 
written while suppressing the tendency to name the color words.  
Finally, shifting or task switching taps the ability to flexibly shift focus between multiple 
tasks or operations (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Monsell, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000). Commonly 
used tests of this ability include the plus-minus task (Jersild, 1927), the number-letter task 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and the local-global task, all of which require one to shift between 
different rules or goals. For example, in a typical local-global task, participants are presented 
with letter shapes that are made up by smaller letters. On some trials, participants are cued to 
identify the larger letter (global figure), whereas on others they need to tell what the smaller 
letter is (local figure). Performing this task requires one to flexibly shift between identifying 
global and local figures. Longer shift cost, measured as the difference in response time between 
switch and non-switch (repeat) trials, is used to indicate poorer shifting.  
It should be noted that although EF has been decomposed into several subfunctions, most 
researchers agree that EF is a hierarchical and dynamic system with shared attributes (e.g., 
working memory capacity, selective attention) among subfunctions (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; 
Miyake et al., 2000; Roberts, Robbins, & Weiskrantz, 1998; Royall et al., 2002; Stuss & 
Alexander, 2000; Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007). Because EF is essential to goal-directed 
behavior, it has been shown to relate to a wide range of complex functioning such as 
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multitasking, reasoning, decision-making and problem solving. Although no one has looked at 
the link between EF and AM reframing, some evidence suggests that EF is linked to several 
dimensions of autobiographical memory such as specificity and coherence.  
Executive function and memory specificity. When asked to retrieve a specific AM, 
some individuals have more difficulty than others - instead of specifying an event that occurred 
at a particular time and place, they tend to give an overgeneral memory (OGM) that is either 
categorical or extended (e.g., “I was depressed last summer”, “My parents don’t get along”). 
Individual differences in this tendency are measured with a standard test called the 
Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT). In this task, participants are given limited time to 
produce specific AMs in response to a series of cue words. The tendency for OGM on the AMT 
has been linked with several forms of psychopathology, including major depressive disorder 
(MDD; e.g., Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2002), 
PTSD (e.g., McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995), and acute stress disorder (e.g., Harvey, 
Bryant, & Dang, 1998). Therefore, researchers are interested in understanding the mechanisms 
underlying OGM.  
It has been proposed that OGM may be explained by several interacting mechanisms (for 
a review, see Sumner, 2011), and the one that has received most attention is functional avoidance 
(Williams, 2006). This mechanism considers OGM as a means of coping through avoiding 
painful specific details of one’s past. As illustrated in the Self-Memory System Model of AM 
representations (see Figure 1; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), our autobiographical memory 
is organized in a hierarchy of lifetime periods, general events and event-specific knowledge. 
Top-down searches for specific memories typically begin at one of the lifetime period or general 
level, which activates of event-specific knowledge, and the retrieval of a specific memory.  The 
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functional avoidance hypothesis proposes that one may abort memory search processes at a non-
specific level to avoid accessing potentially aversive specific details, thus remaining at the 
general event level and producing an OGM. Supporting this account, there is evidence showing 
that OGM is associated with the tendency to use avoidant coping strategies (e.g., disengagement, 
thought suppression), in both healthy (e.g., Bunnell & Greenhoot, 2012; Debeer, Raes, Claes, 
Vrieze, Williams, & Hermans, 2012) and PTSD samples (e.g., Lemogne et al., 2009; Schönfeld, 
Ehlers, Böllinghaus, & Rief, 2007; but see Moradi et al., 2008). 
Another mechanism underlying OGM is capture and rumination. This explanation states 
that self-relevant information (e.g., negative self-schemas) may activate ruminative responses, 
which “capture” cognitive resources at the non-specific level (Williams, 2006), ultimately 
leading to OGM. Consistent with this hypothesis, many researchers reported that individuals tend 
to produce more OGMs on the AMT in response to words that are judged to be more self-
relevant (e.g., Barnhofer, Crane, Spinhoven, & Williams, 2007; Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 
2007; Spinhoven, Bockting, Kremers, Schene, & Williams, 2007).  
Both the functional avoidance and capture-rumination mechanisms may reflect a broader 
deficit in EF. According to the Self-Memory System Model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), 
the voluntary retrieval of a specific event is an effortful goal-directed process that involves 
several phases, including the initial generation  of retrieval guidelines, the activation of event-
specific information, and the evaluation and revision of activated information according to the 
guidelines. These phases are believed to rely on several executive control abilities such as 
working memory and inhibition (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005; Williams, 
2006). A great number of studies have shown that AM specificity on the AMT is positively 
related with EF measured with a variety of tasks, including inhibition, working memory capacity, 
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information updating and verbal fluency (a broad measure of EF that requires participants to 
generate words beginning with a certain letter within limited time; Rosen & Engle, 1997) tests, 
in both clinical (e.g., Dalgleish, Golden, Dunn, & Barnard, 2008; Dalgleish et al., 2007) and 
healthy samples (e.g., Bunnell & Greenhoot, 2012; Ros, Latorre, & Serrano, 2010; Yanes, 
Roberts, & Carlos, 2008).  
Executive function and memory coherence. Once a specific memory is retrieved, one 
needs to organize event-specific information in a meaningful way to form a coherent 
recollection. There is considerable variation in how coherently people can remember past events, 
especially when the events are traumatic or highly stressful. For example, when asked to provide 
a narrative for a past traumatic event, some people form a fragmented, incomprehensible, or 
poorly organized narrative with disconnected thoughts, whereas others are able to create a highly 
coherent account with everything logically laid out and connected (Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 
1995; Greenhoot et al., 2013; McLean & Pratt, 2006; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997). It is 
likely that EF plays an important role in this process. Specifically, creating a coherent AM 
narrative may require one to set up a memory telling structure or guideline (planning), retrieve, 
select and organize memory information according to this guideline (information updating, 
working memory), and inhibit interruptive thoughts or irrelevant information during the narrating 
process (inhibition).  
Although little empirical work has examined the relation between AM coherence and EF 
per se, there is evidence that coherence is impaired in individuals with PTSD, who also tend to 
suffer from EF deficits (e.g., Falconer et al. 2008; Koso & Hansen, 2006; Polak, Witteveen, 
Reitsma, & Olff, 2012). Specifically, many studies reported that individuals with PTSD tended 
to remember the trauma in a more fragmented and less coherent way than those who were 
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exposed to trauma but not diagnosed with PTSD (e.g., Megías, Ryan, Vaquero, & Frese, 2007; 
Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995; but also see Byrne, Hyman, & Scott, 2011; Porter & Birt, 2001; 
Rubin, Feldman, & Beckham, 2004). Also, PTSD patients tend to show impaired EF as 
measured with a wide range of tasks (e.g., Go/NoGo, color-word Stroop) compared to healthy 
individuals (e.g., Cisler et al., 2011; LaGarde, Doyon, & Brunet, 2010; Litz et al., 1996; Shucard, 
McCabe, & Szymanski, 2008). This indirect evidence, combined with the conceptual analysis of 
the cognitive steps required to produce a coherent memory, is consistent with the view that EF 
deficits may at least partly underlie lack of coherence in memories of highly aversive events. 
Executive function and memory reframing.  The study of EF and AM retrieval is 
useful for understanding the role of EF in positive reframing. Because in most cases, reframing a 
past negative event requires one to first recall that event in a specific and coherent way, it is 
possible that the EF dimensions important for specific and coherent memory retrieval (e.g., 
working memory, inhibition) are also recruited in positively reframing negative AMs. However, 
a perhaps more critical EF skill involved in the reframing component of this process is attention 
shifting.  For example, when positively reframing a memory of a car accident, one would need to 
shift from the negative (e.g., My car was totaled) to positive (e.g., I didn’t hurt myself; I learned 
to be more careful) side of the event. Therefore, in this investigation I focused on examining the 
role of shifting in the process of positively reframing negative AMs, focusing on its role in the 
reframing (vs. retrieval) component. To do so, I separated memory retrieval and reframing by 
asking participants to first write about what happened (the memory generation stage) and then 
later reframe the memory narratives (memory reframing stage).  
It has been suggested that the particular type of shifting – shifting between emotional 
stimuli vs. non-emotional stimuli – matters in coping with negative information. This suggestion 
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comes from the traditional literature on EF and emotion regulation, which I now turn to review.  
Executive Function and Emotion Regulation 
Emotion regulation (ER). ER can occur in a variety of ways. First, people can regulate 
emotion explicitly or implicitly. Explicit ER requires much awareness and effort, whereas 
implicit ER operates unconsciously and automatically. For example, in some situations, people 
may need to explicitly remind themselves to think positively to reduce negative emotion, but in 
others, they may engage in this regulation unconsciously. ER research has been primarily 
focused on the explicit forms, and a number of frameworks have been developed to categorize 
the various strategies that people use to explicitly regulate emotion.  
One such framework is the process model (Gross, 1998), which specifies five families of 
strategies that one can deploy at different times: situation selection, situation modification, 
attention deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (see Figure 2). For example, a 
common attention deployment strategy – distraction – involves redirecting attention from the 
emotion-eliciting aspect of a situation to a less arousing aspect, or moving attention away from 
the situation altogether. Another strategy, suppression (an example of response modulation), 
involves decreasing physiological, experiential, or behavioral responding as directly as possible 
after emotional response tendencies have been initiated.   
The strategy that has received most attention in the literature is reappraisal, and this is the 
coping strategy with the clearest overlap with positive reframing. As a cognitive change strategy, 
reappraisal involves a series of cognitive processes that change a negative situation’s meaning in 
a way that reduces its emotional impact. Consistent with the findings from the meaning making 
literature, emotion regulation research has shown that frequent (vs. infrequent) use of reappraisal 
is linked with better psychological health (Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003; Nezlek & Kuppens, 
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2008; Stoeber & Janssen, 2011). Further, training individuals to use reappraisal enhanced 
emotion regulation ability (e.g., Fu, Du, Au, & Lau, 2013; Lau, Belli, & Chopra, 2013). As a 
matter of fact, cognitive change strategies such as reappraisal are generally more effective than 
other strategies including attention deployment and response modulation, according to a recent 
meta-analysis (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012).  
In emotion regulation research, reappraisal is often assessed with a standard task. In this 
task, participants are typically presented with a series of emotion-eliciting stimuli (e.g., pictures, 
films) and are cued to decrease emotion through reappraisal for some trials but not for the other 
trials. Mood ratings after viewing each stimulus are collected, and differences in mood scores 
between regulation and non-regulation trials are used to index reappraisal ability or effectiveness 
of using reappraisal. Although reappraisal measured on this task is similar to memory reframing 
in many regards (e.g., both involve cognitive changes aimed to reduce negative emotion), the 
memory reframing involves reappraising the memory of a stimulus after the stimulus itself has 
disappeared. However, no one has evaluated the effectiveness of reappraisal in the context of 
reframing personal memories. This study filled in this gap by assessing the effectiveness of 
positive reframing in regulating emotion, indexed by positive mood increase and negative mood 
decrease from before to after reframing, and evaluated how it is affected by EF.  
The role of executive function in emotion regulation. Many theorists believe that ER 
draws on several aspects of EF. More specifically, in most cases of ER, one needs to plan a 
strategy to use in advance, inhibit undesired emotional responding, switch focus between 
multiple perspectives, and constantly monitor the progress of emotion modification (e.g., 
Banfield, Wyland, Macrae, Münte, & Heatherton, 2004; Barrett et al., 2004; Denckla, 1996; 
Zelazo & Cunningman, 2007). Despite this belief, the empirical findings regarding the linkage 
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between EF and ER have been mixed.  
First, the linkage has not been consistently found in healthy individuals (e.g., Gyurak, 
Goodkind, Madan, Kramer, Miller, & Levenson, 2009; McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 
2012). For example, McRae and colleagues (2012) reported that individuals with better 
reappraisal ability scored higher on working memory (operation SPAN; Conway et al., 2005) 
and shifting (global/local) tasks but not on other EF tasks (e.g., color-word Stroop). Similarly, 
although some researchers reported pronounced EF deficits in depressed versus normal samples 
(e.g., den Hartog, Derix, van Bemmel, Kremer, & Jolles, 2003; Naismith et al., 2003; Porter, 
Bourke, & Gallagher, 2007), many others failed to find such differences (e.g., Grant, Thase, & 
Sweeney, 2001; Landro, Stiles, & Sletvold, 2001; Vythilingam et al., 2004). The inconsistent 
findings may have to do with the tasks used to assess EF, and an emerging trend is that EF 
abilities measured with emotion-related tasks seem stronger and more consistent predictors of 
ER than EF assessed in non-emotional contexts.  
For instance, difficulty in inhibiting negative information, or negative attention bias, has 
been well documented in many affective disorders, including depression (Hertel, 1997; 
Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Levens & Gotlib, 2010; Linville, 
1996), general anxiety disorder (GAD; e.g., Amir, Najmi, & Morrison, 2009; Najmi, Hindash, & 
Amir, 2010), and PTSD (for a review, see Cisler et al., 2011). A typical task used to identify this 
EF deficit is the emotional Stroop task (adapted from the classic Stroop task; Stroop, 1935), in 
which participants are asked to name the color of a series of emotional and neutral words. 
Longer color naming time for negative words compared to neutral words indicates poorer ability 
to inhibit negative information (e.g., Frings, Wentura, & Holtz, 2007; Goeleven, De Raedt, 
Baert, & Koster, 2006; Joormann, 2004). Another task that assesses the same ability is the 
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negative affective priming task (NAP; Joormann, 2004), in which participants are primed to 
ignore negative information for some trials but need to pay attention to such information in a 
subsequent trial. The delayed responding due to the priming effect is used to indicate negative 
attention bias.  
Recent clinical work showed that training aimed at improving the ability to disengage 
from negative information was effective in ameliorating several psychological symptoms, 
suggesting a causal link between negative information inhibition and coping (e.g., Hofmann, 
Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Najmi et al., 2010; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). 
For example, individuals with GAD who participated in a dot-probe attention modification 
paradigm, in which they were trained to respond faster to probes presented near threat-related 
stimuli, showed reduced anxiety symptoms after training (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; MacLeod, 
Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). 
Research on healthy adults also reveals a strong association between EF measured with 
emotion-related tasks and coping (e.g., Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Malooly et al., 2013). For 
example, Malooly et al. (2013) showed that faster shifting between emotional and non-emotional 
goals was linked with better ability to reduce negative emotion in response to a sad film. Further, 
several studies showed that training healthy adults to inhibit negative information or pay 
attention to positive information enhanced coping and emotional well-being (Amir et al., 2009; 
Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007; Johnson, 2009; Schmidt et al., 
2009; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2011). In one of these studies, Dandeneau et al. (2007) trained a 
group of undergraduate students to respond faster to a positive face presented with a number of 
negative faces for 5 days. The training group reported less negative emotion about an upcoming 
exam and after completing the exam than the control groups.    
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The pattern that EF measured on emotion-related and non-emotional tasks are differently 
associated with coping is consistent with the emerging evidence that these two types of EF 
measures are dissociated. For example, there are cases in which patients who suffered from 
orbital (relative to lateral) frontal cortex lesions showed severely impaired social and emotional 
functioning but preserved ability to perform non-emotional EF tasks (e.g. Bechara & Martin, 
2004; Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996; Hauser, 1999; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Rolls, 2004). 
Moreover, neuroimaging evidence reveals different neural networks involved in performing non-
emotional and emotion-related EF tasks. Specifically, although certain brain areas such as 
DLPFC (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) are commonly involved, emotion-related tasks (e.g., 
emotional Stroop task) depends more on OFC (orbitofrontal cortex) and the coupling between 
PFC (prefrontal cortex) and the amygdala (e.g., Compton et al., 2003; Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & 
Gross, 2008; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Kanske, Heissler, Schönfelder, Bonger, & Wessa, 2011; 
Lee, Heller, van Reekum, Nelson, & Davidson, 2012; Mohanty et al., 2007; Zelazo & 
Cunningham, 2007). The developmental literature suggests this dissociation as well – young 
children seem to struggle more with problems that require emotion control than similar problems 
set in less emotionally significant contexts (Carlson, Davis, & Leach, 2005; Prencipe et al., 2011; 
Zelazo, Qu, & Kesek, 2010). For example, Prencipe and Zelazo (2005) found that 3-year-old 
children were more likely to choose a larger, delayed reward over a smaller, immediate one 
when asked which reward the experimenter should choose, but were more likely to fail this test 
when asked to choose for themselves.  
One theoretical explanation for the differences between EF measured in emotional and 
non-emotional contexts is the cool-hot EF model proposed by Zelazo and his colleagues (e.g., 
Zelazo & Müller, 2002). According to this model, EF-dependent experiences varying in 
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emotional significance elicit somewhat different neurocognitive mechanisms within the complex 
EF system.  In particular, most traditional measures of EF (e.g., Color-Word Stroop Task, Digit 
Span Task) are associated with “cool” EF mechanisms, which rely primarily on the lateral PFC. 
In comparison, EF measured in emotionally significant contexts (e.g., Emotional Stroop Task, 
Delay of Gratification Task) tends to activate “hot” EF, which draws upon not only on lateral 
PFC but also the ventral parts of PFC that connects several parts of PFC with lower affective 
systems such as the amygdala (e.g., Rolls, 2004). Figure 3 is a simplified illustration of the 
relation between cool and hot EF.   
It should be emphasized here that within this model, cool and hot EF are considered 
overlapping rather than independent dimensions. Supporting this notion, a number of factor 
analysis studies of self-regulation in young children have revealed that self-regulatory tasks are 
best described by two distinct but correlated latent factors that appear to reflect cool and hot EF 
(e.g. Willoughby, Kupersmidt, Voegler-Lee, & Bryant, 2011).  For example, Willoughby et al. 
(2011) measured self-regulation with a range of tasks (Preschool Self-Regulation Assessment; 
Smith-Donald et al., 2007) in a sample of children aged 3–5 years old. Using Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM) methods, they found that performance on self-regulatory tasks was best 
described by two positively correlated (φ = .47, p < .001) latent factors representing hot and cool 
regulation, χ2 (3) = 7.5, p = .058, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .01. In addition, Zelazo and 
his colleagues argue that cool and hot EF often alternate to work together in the process of 
solving emotionally relevant problems (Zelazo & Carlson, 2012). For instance, a common 
strategy that individuals use in solving emotionally significant problems is to step back and 
consider them in the abstract (i.e., engage in cool EF processes; Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007). 
However, how cool and hot EF alternate with each other in various problem-solving experiences 
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has not been clearly specified, and need to be explored in future research. 
According to the cool-hot EF model, traditional EF measures (e.g., color-word Stroop, 
digit span) are more related to cool EF, whereas EF measured in emotional contexts (e.g., 
emotional Stroop, delay of gratification), as well as ER measures, are more associated with hot 
EF. This explains why conventional EF tasks are only weakly associated with ER measures (e.g., 
McRae et al., 2012), whereas tasks like the emotional Stroop are more consistently linked with 
emotion regulation in both clinical and health samples.  
The conceptual distinction between cool and hot EF is useful in making predictions about 
the role of attention shifting in memory reframing because it suggests the type of shifting may 
make a difference. Therefore, in this research I aimed to assess and manipulate shifting in two 
contexts: “non-affective shifting”, defined as the ability to switch between non-emotional 
information, and “affective shifting”, defined as the ability to shift attention between emotionally 
positive and negative information. Because no task has been developed to specifically assess 
affective shifting, I adapted the traditional shifting paradigm (non-emotional). Specifically, in the 
non-affective shifting condition, participants saw pairs of neutral faces with opposite eye gaze 
directions and were cued to switch attention between the two gaze directions; whereas in the 
affective-shifting context, subjects saw pairs of emotional faces (all with direct gaze) and were 
cued to switch attention between happy and sad faces. For each task, average response time 
across all trials, and shift cost in terms of response time difference between switch and non-
switch trials, were calculated to index shifting ability.  
Viewed from the cool-hot EF perspective, the affective shifting should be related more 
with hot EF, particularly in terms of avoiding rumination over negative information, and quickly 
switching attention from negative to positive information. In contrast, the non-affective shifting 
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task should be more associated with cool EF in terms of maintaining the goal of switching 
between non-emotional cues in working memory and directing attention to work toward the goal. 
Therefore, I expect affective shifting to be strongly related to positive reframing, which also 
requires shifting between emotionally positive and negative information. However, because cool 
and hot EF are proposed to overlap and related with each other, non-affective shifting 
presumably could contribute to memory reframing as well, but more weakly than affective 
shifting. No one has compared the predictive values of emotional and non-emotional EF 
measures for ER in the same study, and this investigation was the first to examine this question.  
To summarize, based on the literature on memory reframing, executive function and 
emotion regulation, it is predicted that attention shifting, especially affective shifting, plays an 
important role in positively reframing and coping with memories of negative experiences. To 
experimentally test this, I randomly assigned young adults to perform an affective shifting, non-
affective shifting or non-shifting control (but affective) task, and then compared their memory 
reframing and changes in emotional responses after. The rationale of this manipulation was that 
having participants practice shifting might prime them to be in a state of attention switching, 
which could possibly facilitate memory reframing and lead to more increased positive mood and 
decreased negative mood from before to after reframing. Similar paradigms were used in a few 
recent studies that showed single-session attention training, aimed to alter attentional bias toward 
negative information, lead to reduced negative emotion in response to laboratory stressors after 
training (e.g., Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007; Johnson, 2009; 
MacLeod et al., 2002; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2011).  
For example, in one study (MacLeod et al., 2002), college students were randomly 
assigned to two training groups: in the “attend neutral training condition”, participants performed 
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a dot-probe task designed to induce attentional bias away from negative and toward neutral 
stimuli; whereas in the “attend negative training condition”, participants practiced a dot-probe 
task used to induce an attentional bias away from neutral and toward negative stimuli. Following 
the attentional training phase, all participants were exposed to an anagram-based stress task, in 
which participants had to complete difficult problems under timed and videotaped conditions and 
with failure feedback. The results showed that participants trained to disengage from emotionally 
negative information subsequently demonstrated less elevated negative mood state in response to 
the stress task, compared to those trained to display attentional orientation toward negative 
information. 
Our predictions were based on a synthesis of findings from multiple literatures, including 
the work on the meaning making, autobiographical memory narratives, executive function and 
emotion regulation. I extended these areas of research in several important ways. First, although 
evidence from separate lines of work suggests that EF may play a role in positively reframing 
negative memories, no work has examined this relation. In this study, I tested whether attention 
shifting has any specific effects on AM reframing, using both experimental and ideographic 
methods. Second, although EF has been linked with the ability to use reappraisal strategy to 
regulate emotion elicited by laboratory stimuli (e.g., pictures), the role of EF in regulating 
emotion associated with personal memories through positive reframing has not been examined 
yet. In the current research, I observed the impact of attention shifting on changes in participants’ 
emotional states from before to after memory reframing. Third, although both developmental and 
adult literatures suggest that emotion-related and non-emotional EF abilities have different 
implications for affective functioning, little research has directly compared tasks that 
differentially tape these abilities as predictors of emotion regulation. In the present study, I 
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assessed attention shifting in both cool (non-emotional) and hot (emotional) contexts to 
determine whether they have different influences on positive reframing and emotional responses 
to reframing. Finally, although positive reframing of negative AMs have been linked with 
concurrent measures of well-being, no one has directly examined how memory reframing 
affected emotional states. In this study, I tracked participants’ mood states from before to after 
reframing to determine whether positively reframing negative AMs would actually reduce 
negative emotion and increase positive emotion, and evaluated how individual differences in 
reframing were associated with the mood changes.  
Aims of this Research 
This study was designed to examine the role of executive function in positively reframing 
and coping with memories of negative experiences. The more specific goal was to test whether 
attention shifting, especially affective shifting (shifting between emotionally positive and 
negative information), has an impact on positively reframing negative memories in order to 
regulate emotion associated with the memories. To achieve this goal, we asked participants to 
first write about the three most distressing events that they experienced in the past, and then 
engage in one of three cognitive tasks – non-affective shifting, affective shifting, and non-
shifting (but affective) control tasks. After that, we prompted participants to positively reframe 
the memories that they wrote earlier. Positive and negative mood states were collected at four 
times: before and after memory generation, and before and after memory reframing. Reframing 
narratives were coded for quality on several dimensions. The main analysis was determining 
whether having participants practice affective and non-affective shifting affected reframing and 
mood changes from before to after reframing. Because we expected considerable variations in 
positive reframing, I also evaluated the associations of reframing with shifting and other 
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individual difference variables within groups.  
Specific Hypotheses 
The design of this research was expected to reveal the following major effects: 
Hypothesis 1: Impact of shifting on memory reframing. It was hypothesized that 
attention shifting, especially affective shifting, would play a critical role in positive reframing. 
Performing these tasks might prime participants to be in a state of attention switching that could 
facilitate subsequent memory reframing and emotion regulatory processes. Therefore, I expected 
participants in the two shifting groups to score higher on indicators of positive reframing in their 
reframing narratives than those in the non-shifting control group; and between the two shifting 
conditions, affective shifting should show stronger or more consistent effects.  
Hypothesis 2: Individual differences in shifting and memory reframing. I expected 
that individual differences in shifting and positive reframing would be correlated. More 
specifically, participants who showed shorter shift costs (i.e., faster shifting) and who generally 
responded faster on the shifting tasks should have higher positive reframing scores.  
Hypothesis 3: Contributions of shifting to post-reframing mood. I assumed that better 
reframing would lead to more increase in positive mood and decrease in negative mood from 
before to after reframing; and because shifting was hypothesized to promote reframing, I further 
predicted that participants in the shifting conditions (especially the affective shifting group) 
would show greater mood changes.  
Hypothesis 4: Other factors that contribute to variations in memory reframing. In 
addition to shifting abilities, individual differences in concurrent conditions, including mood 
states after memory generation and characteristics of memories (e.g., severity of reported 
events), as well as participant characteristics (gender, age, mental health and coping tendencies), 
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might also contribute to the variations in positive reframing. For example, participants who felt 
worse after memory generation were expected to have more difficulty reframing the memories. 
Moreover, individuals with higher depression scores might exhibit less positive reframing and 
associated mood changes.   
METHOD 
Participants 
 A total of 135 participants (age 18 – 38 years; M = 19.93 years, SD = 2.68) were 
recruited from the university’s introductory psychology research pool, and were randomly 
assigned to three experimental conditions (n = 45 in each condition). One participant in the 
control group failed to complete experimental procedures in appropriate order, and thus was 
excluded from the data. Among the remaining 134 participants, 49 were males and 85 were 
females, all speaking English as their primary language. Most (84%) of the participants were 
white, 8% were African-American, 3% were Asian American, and 5% reported other or multiple 
ethnicities. There were no differences of age and gender between groups.  
A power analysis was conducted to determine the required sample size for this study. The 
reference data were drawn from Nazarian and Smyth (2013), a study that reported the effects of 
writing instructions on narratives about past distressing experiences and emotion, and Calkins et 
al., (2011), a study that reported the effects of performing cognitive tasks on emotional reactions 
to emotional events. Using 80% power as a criterion and the proc glmpower procedure in SAS, 
the analysis indicated that 132 participants were needed. Thus, our sample size appeared to be 
appropriated for the proposed analyses. 
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Procedure and Measures 
Overview. Each participant took part in one data collection session, which took between 
60 and 90 minutes to complete. Following the collection of informed consent, participants filled 
out several questionnaires and completed a few tasks on a computer. First they completed three 
mental health questionnaires. Then they were instructed to write about three most distressing 
experiences that happened to them in the past, and rate each memory on several characteristics. 
Following the memory generation phase, participants performed a non-affective shifting task 
(NAS condition), affective shifting task (the AS group) or affective non-shifting control task 
(Control condition) according to group assignment. Then they were instructed to positively 
reframe the three negative memories. Finally, participants completed a coping questionnaire and 
a demographic and background questionnaire. Ratings on mood states were collected at four 
times throughout the study. Figure 3 summarizes the experimental procedures and measures. 
Mental health questionnaires. Three questionnaires (Appendix A) were administered, 
in random sequence, to measure psychological symptoms and well-being. This information was 
collected in the beginning of the session to prevent participants’ responses from being biased by 
the emotion-eliciting experimental procedures. The Center for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) is calculated as a continuous variable, with higher 
scores indicating a greater number of depressive symptoms, and scores higher than 15 are 
thought to index clinically significant depressive symptoms. The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic 
Scale, a 49-item self report of PTSD symptoms (PDS, Foa, 1995), was used to yield a PTSD 
symptom severity score that ranges from 0 to 51. Finally, the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWL; 
Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985) includes 5 items rated from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 
7 (“Strongly agree”), and a higher mean score on this scale reflects greater life satisfaction. All 
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three measures have shown good test-retest reliability and internal consistency in the literature 
(Diener et al., 1985; Foa, 1995; Pavot et al., 1991; Radloff, 1977; Roberts, 1992; Weissman et al., 
1977).  Not surprisingly, the Pearson correlations revealed a positive relation between PTSD 
severity and depression (r = .30, p = .0005), and a negative correlation of PTSD and depression 
with SWL (rs > .30, ps < .0004).  
Memory generation. In this stage, participants were prompted to describe three most 
distressing events that they had ever experienced. Because the purpose of this activity was to 
elicit negative emotion to be regulated at a later time (in the memory reframing stage), 
participants were instructed to focus on describing what happened and their reactions at the time 
when the events occurred, and were given limited time (5 minutes) for generating each memory 
in order to suppress spontaneous coping responses. The complete narrative prompt is as follows: 
“In this section, we ask you to write about three most traumatic/stressful/upsetting events 
in your life. The events must be experienced at least one month ago and still make you feel 
distressed today. Try to remember specific experiences in which you felt extremely negative 
emotions, such as despair, disillusionment, terror, profound guilt, shame, etc. Even though these 
memories are unpleasant, we would still appreciate an attempt on your part to be honest and 
straightforward and to provide us with as much detail as possible, including where you were, 
whom you were with, what happened, your reaction and the reaction of anyone else involved in 
the event. Please focus on the time when the event occurred, and DO NOT record your thoughts 
or feelings or anything occurred after the event. Please date each memory (month/day/year) as 
accurately as you can, even if you must estimate. If the memory extended over a period of time, 
please report the middle of the period. You will have 5 minutes to write about each memory.” 
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 After typing out each memory narrative on the computer, participants rated several 
characteristics of the memory on the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ; Rubin et 
al., 2004). This scale includes 24 questions that assess participants’ subjective perspective on 
several dimensions, such as the salience of emotional and perceptual details (e.g., ‘As I 
remember the event, I feel as though I am reliving the original event’) and the quality of 
narrative structure (e.g., ‘This memory is fragmented into details with missing bits’). The AMQ 
is included in Appendix B. 
Cognitive task.  After memory generation, participants were instructed to perform one of 
three cognitive tasks according to the condition that they were assigned to. The stimuli were 
pictures of 16 people’s faces (8 males and 8 females). Participants in the two affective conditions 
(i.e., AS and Control groups) were presented with emotional faces with direct gaze, whereas 
those in the non-affective shifting (NAS) group were shown neutral faces with indirect gaze. For 
each condition, there were 192 trials divided into four 48-trial blocks with breaks between blocks. 
The order of the four blocks was counterbalanced between subjects. Participants in all three 
conditions received a short 24-trial training before the actual trials. The three tasks are described 
in detail below, and example trials were shown in Figure 4. 
NAS condition: Non-affective shifting task. A fixation sign was shown in the center of the 
screen for 500 milliseconds in the beginning of each trial. Then a male face and a female face 
with neutral expression appeared side by side in the center, with one face looking to the left and 
the other one looking to the right. At the same time, an arrow was shown above the pictures. The 
location and gaze direction of each gender were random. The task was to judge the gender of the 
face looking to the arrow’s direction. Participants were instructed to press the “m” and “f” keys 
on a keyboard to indicate their answers. There were equal numbers of right and left arrows, and 
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the order of these two types of trials was pseudorandomized so that there were equal numbers of 
switch and non-switch trials in each block. Each of the 16 people’s faces with two gaze 
directions were presented six times, making for a total of 192 trials. See Figure 4 for an example 
trial. 
        AS condition: Affective shifting task. This task was designed to tap the ability to shift 
between emotionally positive and negative information. In the beginning of each trial, a fixation 
sign appeared in the center for 500 milliseconds. Next, a male face and a female face were 
presented side by side in the center, with one face showing a happy expression and the other one 
showing a sad emotion. The location and expression of each gender were randomized across 
trials. Along with the two faces, a cue word - either ‘happy’ or ‘sad’- was shown above the 
pictures. When ‘happy’ was shown, participants needed to judge the gender of the happy face; 
and when ‘sad’ was cued, they should judge the gender of the sad face. There were equal 
numbers of happy and sad cue trials, and the order of these two types of trials was 
pseudorandomized to ensure equal numbers of switch and non-switch trials in each block. Each 
of the 16 people’s faces with the two expressions were randomly presented six times, making for 
a total of 192 trials. An example trial was included in Figure 4.  
Control condition: Affective non-shifting task. This task served as a control for the 
affective shifting condition. Participants were presented with the same set of stimuli used in the 
affective shifting task and followed the same instruction. However, instead of switching between 
happy and sad cues, participants responded to one type of trials continuously for half of the block 
(32 trials) and then responded to the other type of trials. Therefore, shifting attention between the 
two types of affect was not necessary. The order of the happy and sad trial sections within each 
block was counterbalanced between blocks for each participant. 
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A pilot study on four undergraduate students suggested that the three tasks were easy to 
understand and were not overwhelmingly taxing. Each task took around 10 to 15 minutes to 
complete. I did not observe consistent declines in performance over time, and in fact participants 
performed slightly faster in the last block (M =1532 ms) than they did in the first block (M = 
1643 ms).  
Memory reframing. After the cognitive task, participants were presented with the three 
memory narratives that they typed earlier, one at a time, and were prompted to positively reframe 
each memory, in writing, with no time limit. After reframing participants also completed a short 
questionnaire (Appendix C) asking about how often they had shared, thought about and reframed 
the memories prior to the study. The complete instructions were as follows:           
“You just recorded your memories of three most distressing events that have affected you 
negatively. Now we are going to show you the memory narratives that you wrote, one at a time. 
Please take a few moments to think about each event again, but now in a certain way - try to 
think about the event in a different light to make it seem more positive. Write down your 
explanations as to why the event might be positive for you, and any other reflective thoughts or 
feelings. For each memory narrative, you will have unlimited time to record your response.” 
Coping and background questionnaires. In the last stage of the session, participants 
completed the Response to Stress Questionnaire (RSQ; Connor-Smith et al., 2000) that measures 
participants’ tendencies for using various coping strategies (adequate to excellent test-retest 
validity and acceptable internal consistency), and a Demographic and Background Questionnaire 
that elicits demographic (e.g., birth date, gender) and other background information including 
mental health history. These two questionnaires are included in Appendix D.  
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Measure of emotion.  Throughout the procedure, participants’ emotional reactions were 
assessed with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988), which has been widely established as a measure of negative and positive mood state. This 
measure lists positively and negatively valenced adjectives (e.g., sad, angry) and participants rate 
how applicable each adjective is to their current mood state on a scale of 1 (very slightly or not at 
all) to 5 (extremely). As illustrated in Figure 3, this scale was administered four times throughout 
the study: before and after memory generation, and before and after memory reframing. To 
minimize the carryover effects of repeated ratings, we randomly sampled half of the PANAS 
items (10 words) each time. The sampling procedure was based on a study of the construct 
validity of PANAS (Crawford & Henry, 2004), which identified 10 pairs of closely related words 
(e.g., interested-attentative, irritable-hostile). I randomly chose one word from each pair to create 
the mood rating set for each time. The full PANAS is included in Appendix E.   
Coding of Narratives 
First, we evaluated the objective severity of stressful events as reported in the memory 
narratives using the Stressful Event Severity coding (Greenhoot, McLean, Wood & Yoder, 2013). 
We coded for this dimension because how participants reframed their memories may have to 
with the severity of the events in the memories. For the reframing narratives, we coded for the 
four pre-identified types of positive reframing, including Self-Growth, External Benefit, 
Resolution and Gratitude. Most of these codes were adapted from the meaning-making schemes 
used in previous research (Banks & Salmon, 2012; Greenhoot et al., 2013; Lilgendahl, McLean, 
& Mansfield, 2013; McLean & Pratt, 2006). Each category was scored on a 0-2 scale except for 
Self-Growth (0-3), with higher scores indicating clearer and more profound evidence for the 
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specific category of reframing. The full set of coding dimensions and examples are summarized 
in Table 1.  
All coding was completed by a master coder and an additional coder. The master coder 
scored 20% of the narratives that were scored by the other coder. Due to extremely low 
frequency of Gratitude (80% of the participants mentioned no Gratitude at all across all three 
narratives), we dropped this code from the data. The Intra-Class Correlations (ICCs) between the 
two coders were .82 for Event Severity, .75 for Resolution, and .77 for External Benefits, which 
were all within the acceptable range according to similar studies  (e.g., ICCs ranged from .71 to 
75 in McLean et al., 2010). In addition, for each narrative we recorded the number of words and 
the time spent (for reframing narratives only).  
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses  
Pre-manipulation differences between groups. Before testing the effects of group on 
reframing, I checked to see if there were any coincidental group differences that existed before 
the experimental manipulation (i.e., the administration of the three cognitive tasks), including 
mental health, memory narrative, and pre-manipulation mood measures. A series of one-way 
ANOVAs showed that one variable differed among the groups: the decline in positive mood 
from Time 1 to Time 2, F (2, 132) = 3.68, p = .028. Pairwise comparisons showed that the NAS 
group had a significantly higher decline in positive affect from Time 1 to Time 2 (M = .74, SD 
= .62) than the Control (M = .40, SD = .65) group, p = .028. Therefore, this variable was included 
in all group difference models as covariates. The Tukey method was used for multiple 
comparison adjustment in this and all the other group analyses. 
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Cognitive performance differences between groups. Participants’ success on the 
cognitive tasks was measured with accuracy (i.e., mean percent correct responses), their average 
response time, and, for the two shift conditions only average shift cost. To evaluate the 
differences in participants’ success on the three cognitive tasks, I carried out a series of General 
Linear Models (GLMs) predicting the three cognitive performance indicators (i.e., accuracy, 
response time and shift cost) from group, controlling for the one covariate. The model predicting 
shift cost included only the AS and NAS groups. Table 2 shows the means and standard 
deviations on the three measures, as well as the adjusted means estimated from the GLMs, by 
group. The omnibus test showed differences in response time, F (2, 130) = 35.96, p < .0001, but 
not in accuracy, among the three groups. Participants responded fastest to the Control task, 
followed by the AS task and then the NAS task, ps < .0003. I also tested whether there was a 
significant shift cost against 0 for each shifting task. Participants in the AS group responded to 
non-switch trials faster than switch trials, t (44) = 4.64, p < .0001, but those in the NAS condition 
did not show significant shift cost.  
Correlations across narratives. To examine the degree to which participants’ narratives 
had similar qualities across the three memories, I calculated the correlations among the memory 
and reframing narrative measures across narratives. Except for event severity, memory narrative 
measures including word count and the AMQ variables (reliving, importance, visceral responses, 
narrative structure) were highly correlated across narratives (rs > .29; ps < .0006). For event 
severity, only the first and second narratives were significantly correlated (r = .19, p = .032). 
With the exception of External Benefit, the reframing narrative measures, including word count, 
time spent on producing the narratives and other reframing codes, were significantly correlated 
across the three narratives (rs > .17, ps < .049). For External Benefit, the correlation between the 
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first two narratives was only marginally significant (r = .15, p = .077), and both narratives were 
significantly correlated with the third narrative (rs > .17, ps < .049). Given that most memory 
and reframing narrative measures were highly correlated across narratives, I used across-
narrative mean scores in the remaining analyses.  
Interrelations between reframing narrative measures. As shown in Table 3, there 
were several correlations between the reframing measures. First, average narrative length as 
indexed by # of words was positively correlated with all the other reframing measures. Moreover, 
longer time spent on completing the reframing narratives (in second) was generally linked with 
higher reframing coding scores except for External Benefit score. Among the three types of 
reframing, External Benefit was positively correlated with Resolution, but negatively correlated 
with Self-Growth. To index overall positive reframing, I calculated a total reframing score by 
summing the three coding scores. The correlations showed that total reframing score was 
positively correlated with all three types of reframing.   
Mood changes over time. For each time of mood states collection, mean rating across 
the five positive affect words and across the five negative affect words on the PANAS were used 
as the positive and negative mood scores for that particular time. The means and standard 
deviations of positive and negative mood scores across the four times for the whole sample are 
summarized in Table 4.  
Paired t-tests showed that participants felt worse after memory retrieval than they had at 
the outset of the session (i.e., from Time 1 to Time 2), as indicated by decreased positive mood, t 
(132) = 9.86, p < .0001, and increased negative mood, t (132) = 6.69, p < .0001. These changes 
provided some evidence for a successful induction of negative mood. After the cognitive task 
(i.e., from Time 2 to T3), negative mood declined, t (133) = 9.69, p < .0001, whereas positive 
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mood stayed the same. The decline of negative mood was not likely because the three cognitive 
tasks were pleasant to perform (because positive mood did not change), but may be simply a 
fading effect – participants’ negative mood elevated after memory generation faded away with 
time. From before to after reframing (i.e., from Time 3 to Time 4), participants reported reduced 
negative mood, t (133) = 2.46, p = .015, and increased positive mood, t (133) = 3.50, p = .0006. 
This pattern was consistent with our prediction that participants should feel better after 
completing the reframing narratives. Of course, we cannot completely eliminate the possibility 
that the reports of mood states were influenced by some demand characteristics or the simple 
passage of time.  
The Contributions of Shifting to Positive Reframing  
To understand the role of attention shifting in positive reframing, I conducted two sets of 
analyses. First, I tested the effects of group on the qualities of the reframing narratives. Second, I 
examined how with-in group individual differences in shifting abilities were related to reframing 
measures.  
Group effects on reframing. A series of GLMs were carried out to test the effect of 
group on the reframing narrative measures while accounting for the two covariates identified in 
preliminary analyses. Each model predicted only one reframing variable. Table 5 shows the 
actual means and standard deviations, as well as the adjusted means estimated from the GLMs, 
on the reframing measures by group. Note that the models predicting reframing coding scores 
and time spent producing the narratives also controlled for narrative length. As shown in the 
table, there was a trend that the AS group had higher Self-Growth and lower External Benefit 
scores than the other groups; and the GLMs shows External Benefit scores were significantly 
lower for the AS group than the Control group, p = .013.  
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Individual differences in shifting and reframing. As another test of the links between 
attention shifting and memory reframing, I looked at whether individual differences in AS and 
NAS abilities, as indexed by the shift costs for the two tasks, contributed to differences in 
memory reframing within groups. I first included shift cost and the interaction between shift cost 
of group, controlling for group, narrative length, response time and accuracy, in the models. No 
significant interactions were found, thus the interaction terms were dropped from the final set of 
models. Unexpectedly, I found no effects of shift cost, however response time predicted several 
reframing variables within the shifting groups. As shown in Table 6, longer response time 
predicted longer time used to produce the reframing narratives, F (1, 88) = 11.48, p = .0011; 
lower Self-Growth score, F (1, 88) = 7.74, p = .0067; and lower total reframing score, F (1, 88) = 
5.15, p = .026.  
Using a similar procedure, I further tested the predictive value of response time for the 
Control task as well.  Compared to the two shifting groups, response time was not correlated 
with any reframing measures in the control group (see Table 6 for the estimates from this set of 
GLMs).  
Shifting and Post-Reframing Emotion  
I hypothesized that attention shifting should affect participants’ memory reframing and 
further influence their emotional states. Two sets of analyses tested the contributions of shifting 
to post-reframing emotion. First, I tested the effect of cognitive task group. Second, I looked at 
whether within group individual differences in shifting abilities predicted participants’ mood 
states after reframing.  
Group effects on Post-Reframing Emotion. I carried out two repeated measures GLMs 
predicting positive and negative mood from group, controlling for the two pre-existing group 
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differences (see Preliminary Analyses). Each model predicted pre-reframing (Time 3) and post-
reframing (Time 4) mood scores as the dependent variables, with time as the repeated measure or 
within-subjects variable. No interaction with time were found, and there were significant group 
differences in negative mood state, F (2, 129) = 3.28, p = .041, and marginally significant 
differences in positive mood state, F (2, 129) = 2.48, p = .088, for both times. Pairwise 
comparisons (using Tukey as multiple comparison adjustment) for each time further revealed 
that, AS group reported lower positive (p = .059) and negative (p = .077) mood than the Control 
group at Time 3, but not at Time 4. These results suggest that the AS task reduced both negative 
and positive mood after the cognitive task compared with the Control task, probably due to the 
fact that the AS task is cognitive taxing. Supporting this fatigue explanation, response time was 
negatively correlated with positive, r = -.16, p = .075, and negative mood, r = -.14, p = .12, at 
Time 3 across groups. However, the absence of interaction between time and group indicated 
that group had no addition effects on post-reframing mood when pre-reframing mood scores 
were considered. Table 7 displays the actual means and standard deviations, as well as the 
adjusted means estimated from the repeated measures GLMs, of positive and negative mood 
scores at Time 3 and Time 4 by group.  
 Individual differences in shifting abilities. To determine whether variations in shifting 
abilities were associated with different emotional responses to memory reframing within groups, 
I conducted two repeated measures GLMs predicting positive and negative mood at Times 3 and 
4 from shift cost, controlling for response time, accuracy and group. Each model predicted pre-
reframing and post-reframing mood scores as the dependent variables, with time as the repeated 
measure or within-subjects variable. Individual differences in shift cost did not predict mood at 
either time point, nor did response time or accuracy.  
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Reframing and Post-Reframing Emotion. 
One assumption underlying our prediction about the effects of shifting on emotional 
responses to reframing was that variations in positive reframing, influenced by shifting, should 
relate to emotion after reframing. More specifically, I expected that higher reframing scores 
should be linked with more positive mood increase and more negative mood decrease from 
before to after reframing across groups. To test this, I conducted two repeated measures GLMs 
predicting positive and negative mood scores from reframing narrative measures. Again, each 
model predicted pre-reframing and post-reframing mood scores as the dependent variables, with 
time as the repeated measure or within-subjects variable.  Because total reframing score was 
highly correlated with all three reframing coding scores, I removed it from this analysis to reduce 
the number of predictors included in each model. The results revealed a marginally significant 
interaction between time and Resolution, F (1, 128) = 2.91, p = .091; and higher Resolution 
scores predicted more positive mood after reframing, F (1, 133) = 8.60, p = .0040, for Time 4 
only. Moreover, higher External Benefit scores were linked with lower positive mood after 
reframing at both Time 3 and Time 4, F (1, 128) = 3.38, p = .068. The interaction between 
External Benefit and time was not significant, suggesting that External Benefit had no additional 
effect on Time 4 positive mood after Time 3 positive mood was considered. No other reframing 
measures were linked with the mood variables. The estimates predicting Time 4 mood scores are 
shown in Table 8.  
Predicting Reframing from Other Individual Difference Factors.  
I also expected variations in reframing within groups to be predicted by several 
individual difference factors other than shifting abilities, including participant characteristics 
(age, gender, coping tendencies and mental health), mood states after memory generation, and 
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the characteristics of the memories being reframed. Therefore I tested GLMs predicting 
reframing measures from these individual difference factors. Each model predicted only one 
reframing measure and all models controlled for group and reframing narrative length.  
Age, gender, mental health and coping tendencies. To reduce the number of predictors 
in this set of models, I first examined the interrelations among mental health and coping 
tendency indicators to determine which variables to include. Because depression, PTSD severity 
and life satisfaction scores were highly correlated, I only used one mental health measure – 
depression- in each model. As for the five coping variables, I only included three of them – 
secondary control, disengagement and involuntary engagement – in each model as primary 
control and involuntary disengagement was highly correlated with the other coping scores. The 
estimates are presented in Table 9. Depressive symptoms had no associations with reframing, but 
there were several links between reframing and gender and coping tendencies. Compared to 
males, females seemed more adept at memory reframing as indicated by less time used to 
produce their reframing narratives, F (1, 132) = 6.92, p = .0096, higher External Benefit scores, 
F (1, 132) = 11.70, p = .0008, and higher total reframing scores, F (1, 132) = 9.43, p = .0026. 
Moreover, both higher secondary control coping and involuntary engagement coping predicted 
less time spent on completing the reframing narratives, Fs (1, 132) > 6.47, ps < .012.  
Mood after memory generation. In this set of models, I tested the predictive value of 
mood after memory generation (Time 2) for the reframing measures. Each model included only 
one type of mood state scores (positive or negative) and also included gender, group and 
reframing narrative length as covariates. Because Time 1 and Time 2 mood scores were highly 
correlated (r = .72, p < .0001, for positive mood; r = .47, p < .0001, for negative mood), I 
included Time 1 mood score as a covariate as well. As shown in Table 9, higher Time 2 negative 
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mood predicted less time used in reframing, F (1, 132) = 4.12, p = .045, and higher total 
reframing score, F (1, 132) = 4.93, p = .028. Lower positive affect after memory generation was 
linked with higher External Benefit scores, F (1, 132) = 3.39, p = .068. I also tested whether 
mood states right before reframing (Time 3) had anything to do with reframing, but found no 
significant associations.  
Memory characteristics. Finally, the characteristics of the memories themselves may 
have had specific implications for how they were reframed. Table 9 shows the estimates of the 
GLMs predicting reframing measures from a set of memory characteristics, including subjective 
event severity, reliving experience, visceral response, importance and narrative structure (i.e., 
how easily one can put the memory into words). Each model included gender, group and 
reframing narrative length as covariates. A general pattern of these results was that participants 
who recalled more aversive events or reported more negative feelings associated with the 
memories showed more difficulty reframing their memories, whereas, participants who reported 
their memories to be more central to themselves and easier to put into words showed better 
reframing. Specifically, reports of more visceral responses predicted lower Self-Growth scores, F 
(1, 133) = 3.62, p = .059; and higher stressful event severity predicted slower writing during 
reframing, F (1, 133) = 10.09, p = .0019. Individuals who reported their memories to be more 
important included more resolutions, F (1, 133) = 4.75, p = .031, and had higher total reframing 
score, F (1, 133) = 7.80, p = .0061. Moreover, memories there were easier to put into words were 
linked with inclusion of more external benefits, F (1, 133) = 2.18, p = .031.  
Individual differences × group interactions. In the final set of models, I tested whether 
group effects on positive reframing were moderated by any of the examined individual 
difference factors, including shifting abilities, emotion after memory generation, memory 
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characteristics, and participant characteristics. Each model predicted only one reframing variable 
from one individual difference factor and the interaction of that factor with group, controlling for 
reframing narrative length and the two covariates that identified in preliminary analyses. Among 
the tested individual difference factors, memory importance interacted with group in predicting 
Self-Growth, F (1, 132) = 4.40, p = .038, and External Benefit, F (1, 132) = 3.75, p = .055. 
Figure 3 plotted estimated reframing scores at high (M + 1 SD) and low (M - 1 SD) values of 
Memory Importance for all three groups. Tests of group differences at the two Memory 
Importance values revealed that the AS group included more Self-Growth than the Control (p 
= .011) and NAS (p = .058) group, and less External Benefit than the Control (p = .0055) and 
NAS (p = .074) group, but only for individuals who wrote about highly important memories. For 
those who reported less important memories, there were no effects of group. Therefore, it 
appears that the group effects on reframing as reported earlier were more significant among 
individuals who reported highly important memories.   
DISCUSSION 
The major goal of this research was to test the contributions of attention shifting to 
positively reframing and coping with memories of negative experiences. More specifically, this 
study was designed to examine how different forms of attention shifting might contribute to 
positive reframing of negative autobiographical memories and affect emotional responses after 
reframing, using both experimental and idiographic methods. The results of this study provide 
some evidence for the role of attention shifting in memory reframing; participants who were 
assigned to perform the affective shifting task wrote more about self-growth and less about 
external benefits than those who were assigned to non-affective shifting and non-shifting (but 
affective) control group, especially among participants who reported highly important memories. 
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Moreover, faster responding to the shifting tasks (but not the control task) predicted faster 
reframing with higher Self-Growth and total reframing scores.  
Attention Shifting and Memory Reframing 
The group difference analyses revealed that participants who completed the affective 
shifting (AS) task, which involves shifting between emotionally positive and negative 
information, tended to write more about self-growth (e.g., lessons, insights, or personal growth), 
than those who were assigned to the non-affective shifting (NAS) and Control tasks. This group 
effect, moreover, was moderated by the importance of participants’ memories as they rated on 
the AMQ. Specifically, the interaction analysis showed that the AS group had significantly 
higher Self-Growth scores than the other two groups, but only among the participants who 
considered their memories highly important.  
What made the AS group include more Self-Growth than the other two groups? First, as 
proposed at the outset, memory reframing relies on affective shifting ability, therefore, practicing 
AS briefly may have primed the participants in a state of shifting between positive and negative 
information, leading to more positive meaning in the reframing narratives. Second, the fact that 
the AS only increased Self-Growth, but not other forms of meaning assessed (External Benefit 
and Resolution) may be because Self-Growth is more effortful and draws more on the affective 
shifting function. The literature on finding positive meaning in past negative experiences has 
suggested that the kinds of positive meaning that people make are not equivalent and may differ 
in sophistication and involve different levels of cognitive effort. For example, Personal Growth 
that involves drawing insights about the self (e.g., “I became more mature and confident”) is 
thought to be more sophisticated than learning lessons (behavioral changes such as “I learned to 
be more careful while driving”) because it involves deeper and broader changes in how one sees 
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oneself than lessons; and the ability to draw insights about the self appears to develop later than 
lesson. (e.g., Bauer et al., 2005; King et al., 2000; McLean, 2008; Pals, 2006).   
Viewed in a similar way, Self-Growth may be more sophisticated and thus challenging 
than seeking more superficial, externally focused meanings (e.g., Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006; 
Swann, 1997). Given that the affective shifting function is theoretically critical in the process of 
reframing, it is likely that Self-Growth may draw more heavily on this type of executive function 
than shallower reframing such as looking for external benefits (e.g., “I got a new car because of 
the accident”) and focusing on resolutions (e.g., “I called my parents and things turned out fine 
in the end”). This explanation is bolstered by our finding that the effect of AS on Self-Growth 
was exaggerated among the participants who reported memories highly central to themselves, 
suggesting that affective shifting may play a particularly important role in a specific type of 
reframing – reframing that involves finding positive self-changes in negative experiences that are 
more important or self-defining.   
It is also worth mentioning that our group difference analyses also showed that the AS 
group had lower External Benefit scores than the other two condition among people who 
reported high memory importance. One interpretation for higher Self-Growth but lower External 
Benefit scores in the AS group was that there may be a trade-off between these two types of 
reframing within subjects. Indeed, I found that Self-Growth and External Benefit scores were 
negatively correlated across the whole sample, suggesting that the participants tended to 
concentrate on only one rather than both types of reframing. This may partly have to do with the 
instruction given in the beginning of the reframing stage: “think about the event in a different 
light to make it seem more positive”. It is possible that if the participants couldn’t find a way that 
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they have grown positively, they would just seek some more superficial positives such as 
external benefits in order to complete the reframing task. 
Comparisons of the two shifting groups showed that the NAS task, which asks one to 
shift attention between non-emotional information, did not have the same effects on reframing as 
the AS task. This pattern of results converges with the emerging trend from the EF and emotion 
regulation literature that measures of emotion-related EF were more closely related to emotion 
regulation measures than EF measured in conventional, cool contexts (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; 
Dandeneau et al., 2007; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Malooly et al., 2013; McRae et al., 2012; 
Najmi et al., 2010; Johnson, 2009; Schmidt et al., 2009; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2011). As was 
predicted, the affective shifting task might have primed the participants in a state of shifting 
between happy and sad emotional expressions, which facilitated the subsequent finding of Self-
Growth in emotionally negative memories in that group. In contrast, shifting between non-
emotional information (left and right eye directions) as practiced in the NAS group may not be as 
closely related to the type of attention shifting that underlies memory reframing as in the AS task. 
In a broader sense, this finding also supports the theoretical distinction between cool (non-
affective) and hot (affective) EF in their relations with emotional functioning (see Figure 3; 
Zelazo & Carlson, 2012; Zelazo & Müller, 2002).  
However, the cool-hot EF model also suggests that cool EF could also contribute to 
emotion-related problem solving because it overlaps with hot EF. Indeed, although I did not 
observe a causal link between NAS and reframing, our individual difference analyses revealed 
several links between variations in performance on both shifting tasks and reframing measures. 
Specifically, shorter response time on both shifting tasks predicted faster reframing (i.e., less 
time spent on producing the reframing narratives) and higher Self-Growth and total reframing 
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scores. In contrast, response time for the control task (a non-EF task) did not predict any 
reframing measures. This pattern provides some evidence for the linkage of variations in 
emotional functioning with individual differences in both cool EF (performance on the NAS task 
in this case) and hot EF (performance on the AS task) abilities.   
It is important to note that I did not find any associations between variations in reframing 
and individual differences in shift cost – the indicator of attention shifting per se. The fact that 
the manipulation of shifting influenced reframing but individual differences in shifting did not 
may be due to the lack of variation in shift costs in our university student sample. Future research 
may measure shift costs in relations to reframing in a more heterogeneous sample with broader 
mental health and demographical backgrounds. It is also possible that it may not have been 
individual differences in the shifting component of the tasks per se that predicted reframing 
scores, but rather some other dimension of the task such as selective and sustained attention that 
can contribute to individual difference in overall responding speed, which I found correlated with 
several reframing measures. 
Memory Reframing and Post-Reframing Emotion 
I looked at the associations between reframing and post-reframing emotion. First, I found 
significant increase in self reports of positive mood and decrease in self reports of negative mood 
after reframing. However, these mood changes do not necessarily result from the memory 
reframing activity per se but may be due to participants’ expectation of mood changes or/and a 
simple recovery effect of time. Because this research was designed to examine the effects of 
shifting on emotional changes via reframing (rather than the impact of reframing on emotion), I 
could not address these possibilities at this point. To test the emotional impact of memory 
reframing more rigorously, future research should include a control condition in which 
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participants are not instructed to reframe the memories, and should include additional measures 
of emotion that are not based on self-report (e.g., heart rates, cortisol levels). 
I found a few associations between indices of positive reframing and post-reframing 
mood states. After pre-reframing mood states were considered, the repeated measures GLMs 
showed only one reframing measure that predicted post-reframing mood – Resolution. 
Specifically, higher Resolution scores predicted higher positive mood after reframing. Therefore, 
inconsistent with the commonly-held belief that Self-Growth in reframing difficult experiences 
should benefit for coping (e.g., Alea & Bluck, 2013; McLean & Thorne, 2003; Park, 2010), our 
results showed that Self-Growth did not contribute to better mood after reframing. One possible 
explanation is that most of the prior studies examined the associations between Self-Growth and 
concurrent mental health or coping measures (e.g., Alea & Bluck, 2013; Banks & Salmon, 2013; 
Dunlop & Tracy, 2013; Lilgendahl, McLean & Mansfield, 2013; Waters, Shallcross, & Fivush, 
2013), no one has looked at how making Self-Growth meaning was linked with the emotional 
states immediately after reframing. As several researchers have proposed, positive reframing 
may take time to have positive effects (e.g., Pasupathi, 2013). It is thus possible that Self-Growth 
is not effective in regulating emotion associated with negative memories shortly after writing 
about it, but might be adaptive in the long run. To address this question, future research should 
follow up on participants’ emotional responses to reframing over time after the study.  
Surprisingly, in contrast with Self-Growth, more resolutions – a presumably less 
sophisticated form of reframing – were linked with more increase in positive mood shortly after 
reframing, with pre-reframing positive mood accounted for. This suggests that shallower positive 
meaning may be generally more effective in regulating emotion in the short term. However, 
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whether it contributes to long-term coping and adjustment still needs to be examined in future 
studies.   
Attention Shifting and Post-Reframing Emotion 
Although our results revealed several effects of shifting on reframing, as well as some 
linkage between reframing and post-reframing mood, I did not find evidence for direct 
associations between shifting and emotion. I predicted that attention shifting should facilitate 
reframing, which, in turn, lead to more increase in positive mood increase and decline in 
negative mood from before to after reframing. However, the repeated measures GLMs showed 
no group effects on post-reframing mood states when pre-reframing mood states were considered. 
Using similar procedures, I also tested whether individual differences in shifting abilities 
predicted variations in post-reframing mood states, but fount no significant associations. One 
possible explanation was consistent with the one I proposed for the lack of relations between 
reframing and mood changes: the emotional effects of reframing may need longer time to emerge. 
Therefore, although shifting appeared to contribute to positive reframing, it did not, in turn, lead 
to better emotion regulation in the short term. A future direction would be to follow up on the 
post-reframing emotional changes over a longer period of time.  
I did find significant group differences in the mood states at Time 3 (after cognitive tasks 
and before memory reframing). In particular, the AS group reported significantly lower positive 
and negative mood than the control group, as well as lower negative affect than the NAS group. 
The exact reason for this pattern was unclear but one possibility is the presence of affective 
information and requirement for attention shifting in the AS task might make participants in this 
group experience greater cognitive and emotional fatigue, leading to more blunted mood states. 
Supporting the cognitive fatigue explanation, response time was negatively correlated with 
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positive and negative mood at Time 3 across groups. This is also consistent with the research that 
showed a linkage between fatigue and emotional exhaustion (e.g., Lee & Ashforth, 1993).  
To determine whether individual differences in shifting abilities contribute to the 
variations in pre- and post-reframing mood states, I also tested the predictive values of shift cost, 
response time and accuracy, using repeated measures GLMs. However, I found no links between 
the cognitive performance measures and mood states within groups at either time. This result 
may be partly due to the lack of associations between variations in shifting abilities and 
reframing at the first place.  
Other Individual Different Factors and Memory Reframing 
It has been proposed that reframing is a highly complex and dynamic process (e.g., 
Greenhoot & McLean, 2013) and many factors could contribute to the differences in reframing.  
Indeed I found several factors other than shifting abilities to be linked with positive reframing. 
For example, several gender differences were revealed: females were better at finding external 
benefits, had higher total reframing score and also completed the reframing narratives faster than 
males. This finding is consistent with some studies showing that females are generally better at 
making meaning in life stories than are men (e.g., Fivush et al., 2012; McLean, 2008). Such 
gender differences, moreover, may develop through early socialization of girls and boys. 
Previous findings have suggested that parents tend to guide different memory conversations with 
daughters and sons, and may work harder to help resolve negative affect with their daughters 
than with their sons (e,g., Fivush, 1991; McLean & Breen, 2009). It would be interesting to 
examine whether parent-guided conversations aimed to help children make sense of difficulty 
experiences shape how children come to cope with negative memories as adults.  
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Individual differences in mood after memory retrieval also had implications for positive 
reframing. The overall pattern was that participants who had more negative feelings about the 
recalled events wrote more and faster during reframing, and included more external benefits. 
More specifically, the participants who reported more negative emotion after memory generation 
used less time producing their reframing narratives, and had higher total reframing scores. In 
addition, those who reported less positive mood scored higher on External Benefit scores. It is 
possible that individuals who felt worse after generating the memories had greater need to make 
positive meaning.  
Indices of positive reframing were also predicted by several characteristics of the 
memories that were being reframed. In particular, the participants who recalled more 
subjectively severe events and those who reported more visceral responses associated with the 
memories seemed to have a harder time reframing their memories, as indicated by longer time 
spent on generating the reframing narratives and lower Self-Growth scores. This is consistent 
with the general argument that reframing traumatic or highly stressful experiences is more 
difficult and uncommon than reframing less severe experiences (e.g., Lilgendahl et al., 2013). It 
is surprising that emotion after memory generation and emotion reported during memory 
generation showed somewhat opposite effects on reframing. However, given that these two 
emotional measures predicted different types of reframing, it may suggest that participants tend 
to rely on shallow positives (external benefits) and reduce sophisticated meaning making (self-
growth) when feeling bad about a past experience. Although research has started to examine 
factors that influence memory reframing, most of the work has focused on person characteristics 
such as age, sociocultural factors and personality (e.g., Lilgendahl et al., 2013; Bauer, McAdams, 
& Sakaeda, 2005; McLean, 2006; Greenhoot et al., 2013), and little attention has been paid to the 
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concurrent conditions of positive reframing. Our findings highlight the important contributions 
of such factors to the process of meaning making.  
In conclusion, this research provides first experimental investigation of the roles of 
different forms of attention shifting in positively reframing memories of negative experiences. 
Our results show that manipulating attention shifting affects subsequent reframing, and 
individual differences in shifting task performance contribute to variations in reframing. In 
particular, practicing affective shifting (AS) leads to more finding of self-growth, especially 
when the events being reframed are highly important. In contrast, non-affective shifting (NAS) 
has no noticeable impact on reframing. Further, although individual difference in shift cost did 
not contribute to differences in reframing for either type of shifting, faster responding to both 
tasks was associated with indicators of better reframing. The pattern that both NAS and AS have 
some links with reframing, but AS has stronger associations, is in line with the cool and hot EF 
model. Contrary to the common belief that personal growth is beneficial for coping with past 
experiences, our findings suggest that resolutions, rather than more sophisticated Self-Growth, 
may be more effective in regulating emotion associated with the memories, at least in the short 
term. Finally, consistent with the proposal that memory reframing is a complex and dynamic 
process that can be influenced by many concurrent conditions, our findings revealed several 
contributions of narrators’ mood states and feelings about the memories to reframing. This 
research provides additional insights into models of executive function and its linkage with 
emotional functioning, and has potential implications for promoting coping through cognitive 
function training.   
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Table 1. Summary of Narrative Coding Scheme 
Coding 
Dimension 
Description Codes and Examples 
 
Stressful Event 
Severity  
The objective severity of 
the stressful events as 
reported in the memory 
narratives. 
0 = not a severe/challenging/stressful experience. E.g., 
learning to ride a bike, vacationing. 
1 = minimal stress (short-term/temporary, but not 
overwhelming stressors). E.g., taking/failing a test, 
short-term relational conflict, death of pet. 
2 = moderate stress (chronic, but not overwhelming, 
stressors). E.g., long term relational conflicts, long-term 
but stable/manageable illness/disease for self or others. 
3 = severe stress-non-life-threatening. E.g., serious 
mental illness of close person or self, parental 
divorce/separation, sexual abuse/assault of close other. 
4 = severe stress-life-threatening. E.g., serious accident, 
natural disaster, life threatening illness, abuse, sexual 
assault. 
Self-Growth Sophistication of self-
growth that subject gains as 
a result of the event, 
including lessons 
(behavioral changes), 
psychological growth, and 
insights into the 
world/other 
people/relationships with 
other people.  
0 = No self-growth is reported. 
1 = Subject learns a lesson (e.g., “After the wreck I 
learned to be more alert when driving and to always 
wear my seatbelt.”) 
2 = Subject reports a vague psychological growth or 
insight (e.g., “I have changed a lot since then.”) 
3 = Subject gains a clear psychological growth or insight 
(e.g., “I learned about how life can be extremely unfair” 
“I became a stronger person.”) 
External 
Benefit 
Degree to which subject 
gains a benefit as a result of 
the event that is not 
captured by Self-Growth 
0 = No evidence of external benefit 
1 = Vague evidence of external benefit 
2 = Clear evidence of external benefit (e.g., “I got into 
college because of this event”, “The family became 
closer”) 
Resolution Degree to which the main 
character’s problems were 
resolved 
0 = No resolution mentioned 
1 = Vague reference to resolution (e.g., “Things got 
better at the end.”) 
2 = Specific mention of the way in which the character’s 
problem was resolved (e.g., “Other people were there to 
pull me out of the water. ”) 
Gratitude Degree to which subject 
feels grateful that the 
event was not worse 
0 = No evidence of gratitude 
1 = Vague evidence of gratitude 
2 = Clear evidence of gratitude (e.g., “I was lucky that 
this wreck didn’t happen on the highway when I would 
have been going a lot faster.”) 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Cognitive Task Performance Measures by Group.  
Group n 
Accuracy Response time (ms) Shift cost (ms) 
Mean SD Adj. Mean Mean SD Adj. Mean Mean SD Adj. Mean 
Control 43 0.96 0.03 0.96 1425.22 329.16 1410.98 -- -- -- 
NAS 43 0.97 0.02 0.97 2043.16 414.72 2066.26 -16.10 146.27 -16.21 
AS 45 0.97 0.03 0.97 1798.36 319.96 1789.89 95.19 137.65 95.29 
Significant group differences are shown in bold.  
 
Table 3. Interrelations between Reframing Narrative Measures.  
 # of Words Time Spent Self-Growth External 
Benefit 
Resolution Total 
Reframing 
# of Words 1      
Time Spent  0.89**** 1     
Self-Growth 0.22* 0.22* 1    
External 
Benefit 
0.22** 0.14 -0.23** 1   
Resolution 0.31*** 0.21* 0.12 0.38**** 1  
Total 
Reframing  
0.40**** 0.31*** 0.63**** 0.48**** 0.73**** 1 
**** p < .0001 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ap < .07 
 
Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Positive and Negative Mood Scores across Times for 
the Whole Sample. 
 
n 
Positive Mood (1-5) 
M (SD) 
Negative Mood (1-5) 
M (SD) 
Time 1: Pre-retrieval/Baseline 133 3.12 (0.75) 1.62 (0.63) 
Time 2: Post-retrieval/Pre-cognitive-task 134 2.58 (0.89) 2.07 (0.82) 
Time 3: Post-cognitive-task/Pre-reframing 134 2.53 (0.97) 1.51 (0.47) 
Time 4: Post-reframing 134 2.74 (0.96) 1.42 (0.44) 
 
Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations of Reframing Measures by Group. 
Reframing 
Measures 
Control Group 
(n = 44) 
NAS Group 
(n = 44) 
AS Group 
(n = 45) 
Mean SD Adj. 
Mean 
Mean SD Adj. 
Mean 
Mean SD Adj. 
Mean 
Word Count 77.08 54.77 76.58 76.95 47.36 77.70 64.17 39.49 63.93 
Time Spent (sec) 148.85 108.08 141.35 146.98 71.86 140.82 136.36 72.60 149.72 
Self-Growth 1.77 0.95 1.74 1.59 0.99 1.58 1.93 0.91 1.97 
External Benefit 0.86 0.70 0.88 0.79 0.64 0.74 0.47 0.49 0.51 
Resolution 1.05 0.70 1.03 0.89 0.66 0.88 0.93 0.62 0.96 
Total Reframing 3.68 1.54 3.64 3.27 1.34 3.20 3.33 1.28 3.44 
Significant group differences are shown in bold.  
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Table 6. Estimates of GLMs Predicting Reframing Narrative Measures from Cognitive 
Performance Measures.  
  Time Spent Self-Growth External Benefit Resolution Total Reframing 
AS & NAS 
R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B 
.78  .22  .12  .11  .26  
Group  .15  .19  -.42  .08  -.02 
Word Count  .80****  .33**  .18  .34**  .47**** 
Shift Cost  .05  .07  -.06  -.03  .003 
Accuracy  .07  .06  -.06  -.10  -.03 
Resp. Time  .18**  -.33**  .05  -.09  -.25* 
Control 
R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B 
.87  .03  .05  .15  .13  
Word Count  .94****  .16  .23  .28  .33* 
Accuracy  -.05  -.01  .01  .20  .09 
Resp. Time  .09  -.01  -.05  -.21  -.13 
**** p < .0001 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of Pre- and Post-Reframing Mood Scores by Group 
  
  
  n 
Positive Mood Scores Negative Mood Scores 
Time 3: Pre-Reframing Time 4: Post-Reframing Time 3: Pre-Reframing  Time 4: Post-Reframing 
Mean SD Adj. 
Mean 
Mean SD Adj. 
Mean 
Mean SD Adj. 
Mean 
Mean SD Adj. 
Mean 
Control 44 2.80 1.05 2.75 3.04 0.96 2.98 3.04 0.96 1.59 1.49 0.49 1.50 
NAS 44 2.38 0.89 2.45 2.60 0.98 2.68 2.60 0.98 1.58 1.44 0.44 1.43 
AS 45 2.43 0.92 2.40 2.58 0.89 2.56 2.58 0.89 1.37 1.32 0.40 1.32 
 
Table 8. Estimates of Repeated Measures GLMs Predicting Pre- and Post-Reframing Mood 
Scores from Reframing Measures.  
  Positive Mood Scores Negative Mood Scores 
Time 3: Pre-
Reframing 
Time 4: Post-
Reframing  
Time 3: Pre-
Reframing 
Time 4: Post-
Reframing 
R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B 
0.03   0.10   0.04   0.03   
# of Words  -0.14  -0.07  0.43  0.31 
Time Spent  0.14  0.18  -0.39  -0.28 
Self-Growth  -0.05  -0.001  0.01  0.005 
External Benefit  -0.12  -.20  -0.02  -0.1 
Resolution   0.15   .27**   -0.03   -0.39 
**** p < .0001 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
The significant effect on Time 4 mood, with Time 3 mood accounted for, was shown in bold.  
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Table 9. Estimates of GLMs Predicting Positive Reframing Measures from Individual 
Characteristics, Mood States, and Memory Characteristics.  
 
Self-
Growth 
External Benefit Resolution Total Reframing Time Spent 
Model I: Individual 
Characteristics 
R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B 
.09  .19  .16  .25  .82  
Age  -.11  .04  -.05  -.08  .09* 
Gender  .06  .29***  .16  .25**  -.11** 
Depression  -.05  -.05  -.09  -.10  -.01 
Secondary Coping  .06  .12  .29  .23  -.19* 
Disengagement   .07  .03  .01  .06  -.07 
Involuntary Engagement  .16  .01  .20  .20  -.21** 
Model II: Memory 
Characteristics 
R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B 
 .13  .23  .16  .28  .82 
Event Severity  -0.08  0.01  0.03  -0.04  0.13** 
Memory Narr. Length  -0.04  0.14  -0.03  0.02  -0.08 
AMQ: Reliving  0.12  -0.19  -0.04  -0.02  0.08 
AMQ: Visceral Resp.  -0.20a  0.08  -0.12  -0.16  -0.06 
AMQ: Importance  0.16  0.10  0.22*  0.26*  -0.08 
AMQ: Narr. Structure  -0.12  0.19*  0.07  0.04  -0.04 
Model III: Emotion After 
Memory Generation 
R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B R2 B 
.07-.09 .18-.20 .13-.15 .23-.27 .80-.81 
Positive Affect  .13  -.22a  .15  .06  .02 
Negative Affect  .14  .06  .15  .20*  -.09* 
**** p < .0001 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ap < .07 
Estimates for covariates (e.g., group, reframing narrative length) are omitted from the table. 
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Figure 1. The Self-Memory System Model of autobiographical memory representations. From 
“Memory and the Self”, by M. A. Conway, 2005, Journal of Memory and Language, 53, p. 609. 
Copyright 2005 by Elsevier. 
 
 
Figure 2. The process model of emotion regulation. Reproduced from “Emotion Regulation: 
Conceptual Foundations”, by J. J. Gross and R. A. Thompson, in J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of 
Emotion Regulation (p. 10), 2007, New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
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Figure 3. Simplified illustration of the relation between cool and hot executive function. Based 
on the “Cool-Hot EF Model” developed by Zelazo and colleagues (e.g., Zelazo & Carlson, 2012; 
Zelazo & Müller, 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Experimental procedures.   
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Figure 5. An example stimulus display for the non-affective shifting (above) and affective 
shifting/control (below) task.  
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Figure 6. The interaction between Group and Memory Importance in predicting positive 
reframing. **p < .01, *p < .05, ap < .07, bp < .10 
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Appendix A: Mental Health Questionnaires 
 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D) 
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved.  Please tell me how often you have 
felt this way during the past week.    
  Rarely or none of    Some or a      Occasionally        Most or all of 
    the time (less than   little of the     or a moderate       the time (5-7 
    1 day)        time (1-2        amount of time     days) 
             days) (3-4 days) 
 
1. I was bothered by things that usually           
    don’t bother me. 
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.          
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues 
    even with help from my family or friends.           
4. I felt I was just as good as other people.           
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what 
    I was doing.              
6. I felt depressed.             
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort.           
8. I felt hopeful about the future.            
9. I thought my life had been a failure.           
10. I felt fearful.              
11. My sleep was restless.             
12. I was happy.              
13. I talked less than usual.            
14. I felt lonely.               
15. People were unfriendly.            
16. I enjoyed life.              
17. I had crying spells.             
18. I felt sad.              
19. I felt that people dislike me.            
20. I could not get “going.”            
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Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS) – Adapted 
PART 1 
Many people have lived through or witnessed a very stressful and traumatic event at some point 
in their lives. Indicate whether or not you have experienced or witnessed each traumatic event 
listed below by selecting Yes or No.  
 
1. Serious accident, fire, or explosion (for example, an industrial, farm, car, plane, or boating 
accident) 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
2. Natural disaster (for example, tornado, hurricane, flood, or major earthquake) 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
3. Non-sexual assault by a family member or someone you know (for example, being mugged, 
physically attacked, shot, stabbed, or held at gunpoint) 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
4. Non-sexual assault by a stranger (for example, being mugged, physically attacked, shot, 
stabbed, or held at gunpoint) 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
5. Sexual assault by a family member or someone you know (for example, rape or attempted 
rape) 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
6. Sexual assault by a stranger (for example, rape or attempted rape) 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
7. Military combat or a war zone 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
8. Sexual contact when you were younger than 18 with someone who was 5 or more years older 
than you (for example, contact with genitals, breasts) 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
9. Imprisonment (for example, prison inmate, prisoner of war, hostage) 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
10. Torture 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
11. Life-threatening illness 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
12. Other traumatic event 
☐ Yes  ☐ No 
13. If you answered Yes to Item 12, specify the traumatic event below:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________ 
 
IF YOU SELECTED YES TO ANY OF THE ITEMS ABOVE, CONTINUE. IF NOT, 
STOP HERE.  
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PART 2 
14. If you selected Yes for more than one traumatic event in Part 1, indicate which one bothers 
you the most. If you selected Yes for only one traumatic event in Part 1, select the same one. 
☐ 1. Accident 
☐ 2. Disaster 
☐ 3. Non-sexual assault/someone you know 
☐ 4. Non-sexual assault/stranger 
☐ 5. Sexual assault/someone you know 
☐ 6. Sexual assault/stranger 
☐ 7. Combat 
☐ 8. Sexual contact under 18 with someone 5 or more years older 
☐ 9. Imprisonment 
☐ 10. Torture 
☐ 11. Life-threatening illness 
☐ 12. Other traumatic event 
Below are several questions about the traumatic event you selected in Item 14.  
15. How long ago did the traumatic event happen? (Select ONE.) 
☐ 1. Less than 1 month 
☐ 2. 1 to 3 months 
☐ 3. 3 to 6 months 
☐ 4. 6 months to 3 years 
☐ 5. 3 to 5 years 
☐ 6. More than 5 years 
For the follow questions, select Yes or No.  
During this traumatic event:  
 16. Were you physically injured?   ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
 17. Was someone else physically injured?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
 18. Did you think that your life was in danger? ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
 19. Did you think that someone else’s life was in danger? ☐ Yes ☐ No 
 20. Did you feel helpless?    ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
 21. Did you feel terrified?    ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
 
PART 3 
Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have after experiencing a traumatic event. 
Read each one carefully and choose the answer (0–3) that best describes how often that problem 
has bothered you IN THE PAST MONTH. Rate each problem with respect to the traumatic event 
you selected in Item 14.  
 
22. Having upsetting thoughts or images about the traumatic event that came to your head when 
you didn’t want them to 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
23. Having bad dreams or nightmares about the traumatic event 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
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☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
 
24. Reliving the traumatic event, acting or feeling as if it was happening again 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
25. Feeling emotionally upset when you were reminded of the traumatic event (for example, 
feeling scared, angry, sad, guilty, etc.) 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
26. Experiencing physical reactions when you were reminded of the traumatic event (for 
example, breaking out in a sweat, heart beating fast) 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
27. Trying not to think about, talk about, or have feelings about the traumatic event 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
28. Trying to avoid activities, people or places that remind you of the traumatic event 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
29. Not being able to remember an important part of the traumatic event 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
30. Having much less interest or participating much less often in important activities  
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
31. Feeling distant or cut off from people around you 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
32. Feeling emotionally numb (for example, being unable to cry or unable to have loving 
feelings)  
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
33. Feeling as if your future plans or hopes will not come true (for example, you will not have a 
career, marriage, children, or a long life) 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
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☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
 
34. Having trouble falling or staying asleep 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
35. Feeling irritable or having fits of anger 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
36. Having trouble concentrating (for example, drifting in an out of conversations, losing track of 
a story on television, forgetting what you read) 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
37. Being overly alter (for example, checking to see who is around you, being uncomfortable 
with your back to a door, etc.) 
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
38. Being jumpy or easily startled (for example, when someone walks up behind you)  
☐  0 – Not at all or only one time  ☐  1 – Once a week or less/once in a while  
☐  2 – 2 to 4 times a week/half the time ☐  3 – 5 or more times a week/almost 
always 
 
39. How long have you experienced the problems that you reported above? (Select only ONE.) 
☐  1. Less than 1 month 
☐  2. 1 to 3 months 
☐  3. More than 3 months 
40. How long after the traumatic event did these problems begin?  (Select only ONE.) 
☐  1. Less than 6 months 
☐  2. 6 or more months 
 
PART 4 
Indicate if the problems you rated in Part 3 have interfered with any of the following areas of 
your life DURING THE PAST MONTH. Select Yes or No. 
 
41. Work       ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
42. Household chores and duties    ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
43. Relationships with friends    ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
44. Fun and leisure activities     ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
45. Schoolwork      ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
46. Relationships with your family    ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
47. Sex life       ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
48. General satisfaction with life    ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
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49. Overall level of functioning in all areas of your life ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
 
The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWL) 
Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 7 scale below, 
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding 
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.  
 
7 - Strongly agree  6 - Agree  5 - Slightly agree  4 - Neither agree nor disagree  
3 - Slightly disagree  2 - Disagree  1 - Strongly disagree  
 
____ In most ways my life is close to my ideal.  
____ The conditions of my life are excellent.  
____ I am satisfied with my life.  
____ So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.  
____ If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.  
 
Appendix B: Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ) 
                              as clearly as if   
                  it were happening  
            not at all    right now       
1.  As I remember the event, I feel as though I am reliving the original event.        1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
2.  As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind.    1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
3.    As I remember the event, I can see it in my mind.    1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
4.    As I remember the event, I can smell it in my mind.    1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
5.    As I remember the event, I or other people are talking.   1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
6.    As I remember the event, I know its spatial layout.    1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
7.    As I remember the event, I can now feel the emotions that I felt then.  1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
8.    As I remember the event, I can recall the setting where it occurred.  1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
           not at all              completely   
9.    Sometimes people know something happened to them without being able        1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
     to remember it.  As I think about the event, I can actually remember it  
     rather than just knowing it happened. 
10.   My memory is fragmented into details with missing bits.   1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
11.   As I remember the event, it comes to me in words.    1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
12.   As I remember the event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it   1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
       happened, that I am a subject in it again, rather than an outside  
       observer tied to the present. 
13.  As I remember the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a   1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
      coherent story or episode, and not as an isolated fact, observation, or scene. 
14.   This memory is significant to my life because it imparts and important           1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
        message for me or represents an anchor, critical juncture, or turning point. 
15.  My memory has no details specific to my life. It is based on general      1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
       knowledge that I would expect most people to have.      
16.  If another witness to the event, who you generally trusted, existed and told  1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
      you a very different account of the event, to what extent could you be  
       persuaded that your memory was wrong? 
           100% imaginary 100% real  
17.  I believe the event in my memory really occurred in the way that I   1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
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      remember it and that I have not imagined or fabricated anything that did  
      not occur.                                      As often as  
                           any event in 
                       Not at all                               my life 
18.  Since it happened, I have thought or talked about this event.    1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
                                                      As much as  
                       Not at all                any memory 
19.  While remembering the event, I feel happy.     1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
20.  While remembering the event, I feel my heart pound, race, or quicken. 1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
21.  While remembering the event, I feel sweaty or clammy.   1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
22.  While remembering the event, I feel tense all over.    1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
23.  While remembering the event, I feel knots, butterflies, or cramps   1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
       in my stomach 
24.  To the best of your knowledge, is the memory of an event that occurred once at one particular time 
and place, a summary or merging of many similar or related events, or for events that occurred over a 
fairly continuous extended period of time lasting more than one day?    Single day   Merged
 Extended 
               1        2       3 
 
 
Appendix C: Memory Reframing Questionnaire 
 
Memory Narrative 1: [participant’s first narrative here…] 
                All the 
               Never      Sometimes       time 
Before this study, how often did you share that memory with others?     1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
Before this study, how often did you think about that memory?                          1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
Before this study, how often did you see that memory in a positive way?           1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
Memory Narrative 2: [participant’s second narrative here…] 
                All the 
               Never      Sometimes       time 
Before this study, how often did you share that memory with others?     1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
Before this study, how often did you think about that memory?                          1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
Before this study, how often did you see that memory in a positive way?           1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
Memory Narrative 3: [participant’s third narrative here…] 
                All the 
               Never      Sometimes       time 
Before this study, how often did you share that memory with others?     1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
Before this study, how often did you think about that memory?                          1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
Before this study, how often did you see that memory in a positive way?           1    2   3   4   5   6   7 
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Appendix D: Coping and Background Questionnaires 
 
The Response to Stress Questionnaire (RSQ) – Adapted 
A. Even when things are going well, almost everyone still has some exposure to interpersonal conflict. 
1. So that we can find out how things have been going for you lately, please put a check mark by all the things on 
this list that have been a problem for you recently. 
⁪ Arguments with your parents 
⁪ Being criticized by family members 
⁪ Being asked to do things you are not comfortable with by people close to you 
⁪ Unreasonable expectations and/or requests by people close to you 
⁪ Having physical disputes with people you care about 
⁪ Seeing physical disputes between people you care about 
⁪ Witnessing verbal arguments between people you care about 
 
2. Circle the number that shows how stressful, or how much of a hassle these problems were for you. 
 1   2   3    4 
 Not at all  A little   Somewhat   Very 
 
B. This is a list of things that people sometime do, think, or feel when something stressful happens.  Everybody 
deals with problems in their own ways – some people do a lot of the things on this list or have a bunch of feelings, 
other people just do or think a few things. 
Think of the situations you just checked off.  For each item on the list below, circle one number from 1 (not at all) 
to 4 (a lot) that shows how much you do or feel these things when you have interpersonal conflict like the items you 
just checked off.  Please let us know about everything you do, think, and feel, even if you don’t’ think it helps make 
things better. 
 How much do you do this? 
                         Not         A     Some    A lot 
                                 at all       little 
1. I try not to feel anything.                                  1            2         3          4 
2. When I have problems with other people I feel sick to my stomach or get headaches. 1            2         3          4 
3. I try to think of different ways to change the problem or fix the situation.  1            2         3          4 
 Write one plan you thought of: ______________________________________ 
4. When interpersonal conflicts happen I don’t feel anything, it’s like I have no feelings.   1            2         3          4 
5. I wish that I were stronger, smarter, or more popular so that things would be different. 1            2         3          4 
6. I keep remembering what happened with other people or can’t stop thinking about  1            2         3          4 
 what might happen. 
7. I let someone or something know how I feel. (Remember to circle a number). -------   1            2         3          4 
 Check all you talked to: 
 ⁪ Parent ⁪ Friend ⁪ Brother/Sister ⁪ Boyfriend/Girlfriend/Spouse ⁪ Pet 
 ⁪ Teacher ⁪ God  ⁪ Counselor ⁪ Other mentor   ⁪ None of these 
 
8. I decide I’m okay the way I am, even though I’m not perfect.   1            2         3          4 
9. When I’m around other people I act like the problems never happened.  1            2         3          4 
10. I just have to get away when I have interpersonal conflicts, I can’t stop myself. 1            2         3          4 
11. I deal with the problem by wishing it would just go away, that everything would  1            2         3          4 
 work itself out. 
12. I get really jumpy when I’m having problems with others.    1            2         3          4 
13. I realize that I just have to live with things the way they are.   1            2         3          4 
14. When I have problems with others, I just can’t be near anything that reminds me of  1            2         3          4 
 the situation. 
15. I try not to think about it, to forget all about it.     1            2         3          4 
16. When interpersonal conflicts come up I really don’t know what I feel.  1            2         3          4 
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17. I ask other people for help or for ideas about how to make the problem better. ------ 1            2         3          4 
           (Remember to circle a number.) 
 Check all you talked to: 
 ⁪ Parent ⁪ Friend ⁪ Brother/Sister ⁪ Boyfriend/Girlfriend/Spouse ⁪ Pet 
 ⁪ Teacher ⁪ God  ⁪ Counselor ⁪ Other mentor   ⁪ None of these 
 
18. When I’m having problems with others, I can’t stop thinking about them when I  1            2         3          4 
 try to sleep, or I have bad dreams about them. 
19. I tell myself that I can get through this, or that I’ll do better next time.  1            2         3          4 
20. I let my feelings out. (Remember to circle a number.)  --------------------------------- 1            2         3          4 
 I do this by: (Check all that you did.) 
 ⁪ Writing in my journal/diary  ⁪ Drawing/painting 
 ⁪ Complaining to let off steam  ⁪ Being sarcastic/making fun 
 ⁪ Listening to music   ⁪ Punching a pillow 
 ⁪ Exercising    ⁪ Yelling   
 ⁪ Crying    ⁪ None of these 
 
21. I get help from others when I’m trying to figure out how to deal with my feelings.  1            2         3          4 
 Check all that you went to: 
 ⁪ Parent ⁪ Friend ⁪ Brother/Sister ⁪ Boyfriend/Girlfriend/Spouse ⁪ Pet 
 ⁪ Teacher ⁪ God  ⁪ Counselor ⁪ Other mentor   ⁪ None of these 
 
22. I just can’t get myself to face the person I’m having problems with or the situation. 1            2         3          4 
23. I wish that someone would just come and get me out of the mess.   1            2         3          4 
24. I do something to try to fix the problem or take action to change things.  1            2         3          4 
 Write one thing that you did: ________________________________________ 
25. Thoughts about my interpersonal conflicts just pop into my head.   1            2         3          4 
26. When I have problems with others, I feel it in my body.  ------------------------------- 1            2         3          4 
                                 (Remember to circle a number.) 
 Check all that happen: 
 ⁪ My heart races   ⁪ My breathing speeds up 
 ⁪ I feel hot or sweaty  ⁪ My muscles get tight 
 ⁪ None of these 
 
You’re half done! Before you keep working, look back at the first page so you remember what kinds of 
interpersonal conflicts you told us about.  Remember to answer these questions thinking about those 
problems. 
 
27. I try to stay away from people and things that make me feel upset or remind me of  1            2         3          4 
 the problem. 
28. I don’t feel like myself when I have interpersonal conflict, it’s like I’m far away 1            2         3          4 
 from everything. 
29.  I just take things as they are, I go with the flow.     1            2         3          4 
30. I think about happy things to take my mind off the problem or how I’m feeling. 1            2         3          4 
31. When interpersonal conflicts come up, I can’t stop thinking about how I am feeling. 1            2         3          4 
32. I get sympathy, understanding, or support from someone. ---------------------------- 1            2         3          4   
            (Remember to circle a number.)  
 Check all you went to: 
 ⁪ Parent ⁪ Friend ⁪ Brother/Sister ⁪ Boyfriend/Girlfriend/Spouse ⁪ Pet 
 ⁪ Teacher ⁪ God  ⁪ Counselor ⁪ Other mentor   ⁪ None of these 
 
33. When interpersonal conflicts happen, I can’t always control what I do. ----------- 1            2         3          4   
            (Remember to circle a number.)  
 Check all that happen: 
 ⁪ I can’t stop eating  ⁪ I can’t stop talking 
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 ⁪ I do dangerous things  ⁪ I have to keep fixing/checking things 
 ⁪ None of these 
 
34. I tell myself that things could be worse.      1            2         3          4   
35. My mind just goes blank when I have problems with others, I can’t think at all. 1            2         3          4   
36. I tell myself that it doesn’t matter, that it isn’t a big deal.    1            2         3          4   
37. When I have problems with others right away I feel really (Check all you feel.) --- 1            2         3          4   
           (Remember to circle a number.) 
 
 ⁪ Angry ⁪ Sad  ⁪ Scared  ⁪ Worried/anxious ⁪ None of these 
 
38. It’s really hard to concentrate or pay attention when I have problems with others. 1            2         3          4   
39. I think about the things I’m learning from the situation, or something good that will  1            2         3          4    
 come from it. 
40. When I have problems with others I can’t stop thinking about what I did or said. 1            2         3          4   
41. When something goes wrong with others, I say to myself, “This isn’t real.”  1            2         3          4   
42. When I’m having interpersonal conflicts I end up just lying around or sleeping a lot. 1            2         3          4   
43. I keep my mind off problems with others by: (Remember to circle a number.)  ---- 1            2         3          4   
 Check all that you do: 
 ⁪ Exercising  ⁪ Seeing friends  ⁪ Watching TV 
 ⁪ Playing video games ⁪ Doing a hobby  ⁪ None of these 
 
44. When problems with others come up, I get upset by things that don’t usually bother 1            2         3          4   
 me. 
45. I do something to calm myself down when I’m having problems with others.  ------ 1            2         3          4   
              (Remember to circle a number.) 
 Check all that you do: 
 ⁪ Take deep breaths ⁪ Pray  ⁪ Walk   
 ⁪ Listen to music ⁪ Take a break ⁪ Meditate ⁪ None of these 
 
46. I just freeze when I have interpersonal conflicts, I can’t do anything.  1            2         3          4   
47. When I’m having a problem with others, sometimes I act without thinking.  1            2         3          4   
48. I keep my feelings under control when I have to, then let them out when they won’t  1            2         3          4   
 make things worse. 
49. When problems with other people happen I can’t seem to get around to doing things 1            2         3          4   
 I’m supposed to do. 
50. I tell myself that everything will be all right.     1            2         3          4   
51. When I have problems with other people, I can’t stop thinking about why they  1            2         3          4   
 happened to me. 
52. I think of ways to laugh about it so that it won’t seem so bad.   1            2         3          4   
53. My thoughts start racing when I’m having a tough time with other people.  1            2         3          4   
54. I imagine something really fun or exciting happening in my life.   1            2         3          4   
55. When a rough situation with other people happens, I can get so upset that I can’t   1            2         3          4   
 remember what happened or what I did. 
56. I try to believe it never happened.      1            2         3          4   
57. When I have interpersonal conflicts, sometimes I can’t control what I do or say. 1            2         3          4   
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Demographic and Background Questionnaire 
(1) Ethnicity: ______________________ 
(2) Gender:   Male             Female  
(3) Date of Birth: ___________________ 
(4) Age: __________________________ 
(5) What year are you (e.g., sophomore, junior, etc.)? __________ 
(6) What was your most recent GPA?  _______________ 
(7) Have you ever gone to counseling or been treated for a mental health difficulty (e.g., 
adjustment, depression, anxiety, ADHD)?  
        YES              NO  
(8) What was the approximate date of your last visit? _________________ 
(9) Why did you seek counseling or mental health treatment? 
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Appendix E: The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form (PANAS-X) 
 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions.  Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.   
Indicate to what extent you have felt this way right now.  Use the following scale to record your 
answers: 
 1  2  3  4  5 
very slightly                   a little                    moderately                quite a bit                  extremely 
  or not at all 
 
______ cheerful ______ sad ______ active ______ angry at self 
______ disgusted ______ calm ______ guilty  ______ enthusiastic 
______ attentive ______ afraid ______ joyful ______ downhearted 
______ bashful ______ tired ______ nervous  ______ sheepish 
______ sluggish ______ amazed ______ lonely ______ distressed 
______ daring ______ shaky ______ sleepy ______ blameworthy 
______ surprised ______ happy ______ excited ______ determined 
______ strong ______ timid ______ hostile ______ frightened 
______ scornful ______ alone ______ proud ______ astonished 
______ relaxed ______ alert ______ jittery ______ interested 
______ irritable ______ upset ______ lively ______ loathing 
______ delighted ______ angry ______ ashamed ______ confident 
______ inspired ______ bold ______ at ease ______ energetic 
______ fearless ______ blue ______ scared ______ concentrating 
______ disgusted ______ shy ______ drowsy ______ dissatisfied 
              with self                               with self 
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